The Argument and Some Objections

We have explored Feinberg and Willer’s argument that cultural differences in moral psychology explain political conflict on climate change.

I broke this into five considerations:

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’ (see Do Ethical Attitudes Shape Political Behaviours?)
2. There are at least two foundational domains of human morality, including harm and purity. Also, Moral Foundations Theory is true (see Moral Pluralism: Beyond Harm; Moral Foundations Theory: An Approach to Cultural Variation; and Operationalising Moral Foundations Theory)
3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’ (see Liberals vs Conservatives)
4. ‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms’ (see Moral Psychology Drives Environmental Concern)
5. ‘exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’ (see Framing Changes Ethical Attitudes)

At this point you should understand the argument. You should also understand how it aims to support the claim that cultural differences in moral psychology explain political conflict on climate change.

What is a philosopher doing here? On the face of it, the argument is simply a (brilliant) piece of social science. No philosopher needed.

But the argument gives rise to a puzzle. To see the puzzle, first consider some objections.

Objection 2

This objection to the third of the five points above (‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’) concerns measurement invariance.

As we have already seen (in Operationalising Moral Foundations Theory), attempts to demonstrate scalar invariance have all or mostly failed; and Iurino & Saucier (2020) even fail to find support for the five-factor model, which casts doubt on whether the original Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ-1) meets requirements for model fit in all populations.

We are therefore not justified in using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ-1) to compare means across different groups. But this is exactly what the claim that ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’ requires us to do.

Note that this objection seeks to establish that we do not know Claim 3; it is not an argument that this claim is false.

Objection 3: Joan-Lars-Joseph

The evidence on cultural variation says socially conservative participants and socially liberal participants tend to regard the care and fairness foundations as having roughly the same moral relevance.^[1]

This does not generate the prediction that socially conservative participants will be more likely to view climate issues as ethical issues when linked on one foundation (e.g. purity) than when linked to another foundation (e.g. harm).

Contrast Feinberg & Willer (2019, p. 4):

‘Why does moral reframing work? The primary explanation is that morally reframed messages are influential because targets perceive a “match” between their moral convictions and the argument in favor of the other side's policy position.’

The Joan-Lars-Joseph objection^[2] is this: if we take the claims cultural differences in moral psychology to be true, framing environmental issues in terms of purity should not cause conservatives to perceive more or less of a “match” than framing environmental issues in terms of harm.

This is an objection to the theoretical argument for the fourth claim in the five points above (‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms’).

Note that Objections 2 and 3 are complementary: #2 aims to show that we lack evidence that liberals and conservatives differ in their moral psychology; #3 assumes that we have such evidence and aims to show that it does not support the conclusion about moral framing.

A Puzzle

If the evidence for cultural variation in moral psychology is at best weak (Objections 1 and 2), and if the theoretical argument for moral reframing is flawed (Objection 3), why does moral reframing seem to work?