Conclusion
Discoveries in moral psychology can undermine, and support, ethical principles
if either or both of Foot’s or Kamm’s broad approaches are not entirely misguided.
Does this mean
Kant (1870, p. AK 4:425–6) was wrong? Not obviously.
If we adopt Thomson’s other method of trolley cases, we have yet to find a
role for discoveries in moral psychology. Nor do arguments from framing effects appear
sufficient to establish that discoveries in moral psychology are ethically relevant
(contra
Rini, 2013 and
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008).
But perhaps our perspective will change when we attempt to gain a deeper
understanding of the psychology of ethical judgements.
Notes
Empirical claims on which discoveries in moral
psychology bear are directly involved in some ethical arguments, including those
offered by Foot, Singer and Kamm (see Foot and Trolley Cases: Kant Was Wrong and Singer vs Kamm on Distance).
Recent philosophical discussion has tended to
focus on the use of discoveries in moral psychology for supporting very general
arguments aimed at showing moral intuitions are not justified
(for example, Königs, 2020;
Rini, 2016; Kumar & Campbell, 2012;
Sandberg & Juth, 2011; see Debunking Arguments).
Such discussions typically conclude that discoveries in moral
psychology have little or no significance for ethics.
It may be correct that the very general arguments considered do not yield substantive new
ethical knowledge.
But in this lecture we have seen how examining particular ethical arguments points to a
different conclusion.
Discoveries in moral psychology can be important, in a direct and straightforward way,
to evaluating some arguments in ethics.
Glossary
moral intuition :
According to this lecturer, a person’s intuitions are the claims they take to be true
independently of whether those claims are justified inferentially. And a person’s moral intuitions are
simply those of their intuitions that concern ethical matters.
According to Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman (2010, p. 256), moral intuitions are ‘strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs.’
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