Conclusion: Yet Another Puzzle
The research on dumbfounding and disengagement confronts us with a third puzzle
which any acceptable theory of moral intution and action should solve.
Notes
Our overall question for this lecture was,
How, if at all, does a person’s reasoning influence their moral judgements?
From the two bodies of research on moral dumbfounding and moral disengagement,
we can conclude that any answer to this question must be consistent the discovery that
moral judgements are sometimes, but not always, a consequence of reasoning from known principles.
Further, there is no special reason to suppose that reasoning might not give rise to
characteristically deontological as well as
characteristically consequentialist moral judgements; or contractualist judgements
(Scanlon, 1998) or any other kind of moral judgements.
As we have seen, this is a problem for
proponents of a Linguistic Analogy.
It is also an objection to several researchers’ strong claims about reasoning
functioning only for giving retrospective justification for moral judgements that have
already been made (as we saw in Moral Disengagement: Significance).
Looking forward (hold this in mind for the future),
it is also perhaps a problem for to Greene’s dual-process theory,
which we have yet to encounter (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, 2014).
Four Puzzles (Review)
We have now seen four puzzles ...
[emotion] Why do feelings of disgust (and perhaps other emotions) sometimes influence moral judgements? And why do we sometimes feel disgust in response to moral transgressions? (see Moral Intuitions and Emotions: Evaluating the Evidence)
[structure] Why do patterns in moral judgements reflect legal principles humans are typically unaware of? (see A Linguistic Analogy)
[order-effects] Why are people’s moral judgements about Switch and Drop subject to order-of-presentation effects
(see Framing Effects and Mikhail’s Linguistic Analogy)
[dumbfounding-disengagement] Why are moral judgements sometimes, but not always, a consequence of reasoning from known principles?
(see Moral Dumbfounding and Moral Disengagement: The Theory)
Why The Four Puzzles Matter
To understand the roles of feeling and reasoning in moral intuitions and judgements,
we must identify or create a theory that can solve the puzzles,
is theoretically coherent and empirically motivated,
and generates novel testable predictions.
Ask a Question
Your question will normally be answered in the question
session of the next lecture.
More information about asking questions.
Glossary
characteristically consequentialist :
According to Greene, a judgement is characteristically consequentialist
(or characteristically utilitarian) if it is one in
‘favor of characteristically consequentialist conclusions (eg, “Better to save more lives”)’ (Greene, 2007, p. 39).
According to Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, & Hütter (2017, p. 365), ‘a given judgment cannot be categorized
as [consequentialist] without confirming its property of being sensitive to consequences.’
characteristically deontological :
According to Greene, a judgement is characteristically deontological
if it is one in
‘favor of characteristically deontological conclusions (eg, “It’s wrong despite the benefits”)’ (Greene, 2007, p. 39).
According to Gawronski et al. (2017, p. 365), ‘a given judgment cannot be categorized
as deontological without confirming its property of being sensitive to
moral norms.’
Drop :
A dilemma; also known as Footbridge. A runaway trolley is about to run over and kill five people.
You can hit a switch that will release the bottom of a footbridge and
one person will fall onto the track. The trolley will hit this person,
slow down, and not hit the five people further down the track.
Is it okay to hit the switch?
moral disengagement :
Moral disengagement occurs when self-sanctions are disengaged from
conduct. To illustrate, an executioner may avoid self-sanctioning for killing
by reframing the role they play as ‘babysitting’ (Bandura, 2002, p. 103).
Bandura (2002, p. 111) identifies several
mechanisms of moral disengagement: ‘The disengagement may centre on
redefining harmful conduct as honourable by moral justification, exonerating
social comparison and sanitising language. It may focus on agency of action
so that perpetrators can minimise their role in causing harm by diffusion
and displacement of responsibility. It may involve minimising or distorting
the harm that follows from detrimental actions; and the disengagement may
include dehumanising and blaming the victims of the maltreatment.’
moral dumbfounding :
‘the stubborn and puzzled maintenance of an [ethical] judgment without supporting reasons’ (Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000, p. 1). As McHugh, McGann, Igou, & Kinsella (2017) note, subsequent researchers have given different definitions of moral dumbfounding so that ‘there is [currently] no single, agreed definition of moral dumbfounding.’ I adopt the original authors’ definition, as should you unless there are good reasons to depart from it.
moral intuition :
According to this lecturer, a person’s intuitions are the claims they take to be true
independently of whether those claims are justified inferentially. And a person’s moral intuitions are
simply those of their intuitions that concern ethical matters.
According to Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman (2010, p. 256), moral intuitions are ‘strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs.’
Trolley :
A dilemma; also known as Switch. A runaway trolley is about to run over
and kill five people.
You can hit a switch that will divert the trolley onto a different set of tracks
where it will kill only one.
Is it okay to hit the switch?
References
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Endnotes