Glossary
Glossary
Affect Heuristic : In the context of moral psychology, the Affect Heuristic is this principle:
‘if thinking about an act [...] makes you feel bad [...], then judge that it is
morally wrong’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman, 2010). These authors hypothesise that the
Affect Heuristic explains moral intuitions.
A different (but related) Affect Heurstic has also be postulated to explain how people make judgements about risky things are: The more dread you feel when imagining an event, the more risky you should judge it is (see Pachur, Hertwig, & Steinmann, 2012, which is discussed in The Affect Heuristic and Risk: A Case Study).
A different (but related) Affect Heurstic has also be postulated to explain how people make judgements about risky things are: The more dread you feel when imagining an event, the more risky you should judge it is (see Pachur, Hertwig, & Steinmann, 2012, which is discussed in The Affect Heuristic and Risk: A Case Study).
Asian disease : A disease will kill 600 people for sure without an intervention.
You are a decision maker tasked with choosing between two intervensions.
Your choice can be framed in two ways.
Frame 1: Either save 200 people for sure, or else take a one in three chance that
everyone will be saved with a two in three chance that no one will be saved.
Frame 2: Either allow 400 people to die for sure, or else take a one in three chance
that nobody will die and a two in three chance that everyone will die.
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)
automatic : As we use the term, a process is automatic just if whether or not it
occurs is to a significant extent independent of your current task,
motivations and intentions. To say that mindreading is automatic is
to say that it involves only automatic processes. The term `automatic' has
been used in a variety of ways by other authors: see
Moors (2014, p. 22) for a one-page overview,
Moors & De Houwer (2006) for a detailed theoretical review, or
Bargh (1992) for a classic and very readable introduction
Autonomy Thesis : The thesis that ‘ethical theory is autonomous of other forms of intellectual inquiry in that
its fundamental deliberations do not depend on input from other subjects, especially empirical ones’ (Rini, 2013, p. 259). See (Kant, 1870, p. AK 4:425--6) for an endorsement.
binding foundations : Categories of moral concern linked to social needs; these are often taken to be
betrayal/loyalty, subversion/authority, and impurity/purity (Graham et al., 2011).
Cannibal : ‘Jennifer works in a medical school pathology lab as a research assistant.
The lab prepares human cadavers that are used to teach medical students
about anatomy. The cadavers come from people who had donated their body for
the general use of the researchers in the lab. The bodies are normally
cremated, however, severed cuts may be disposed of at the discretion of lab
researchers, One night Jennifer is leaving the lab when she sees a body that
is going to be discarded the next day. Jennifer was a vegetarian, for moral
reasons. She thought it was wrong to kill animals for food. But then, when
she saw a body about to be cremated, she thought it was irrational to waste
perfectly edible meat. So she cut off a piece of flesh, and took it home and
cooked it. The person had died recently of a heart attack, and she cooked
the meat thoroughly, so there was no risk of disease.’
(McHugh, Zhang, Karnatak, Lamba, & Khokhlova, 2023, p. supplementary materials; based on Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000)
characteristically consequentialist : According to Greene, a judgement is characteristically consequentialist
(or characteristically utilitarian) if it is one in
‘favor of characteristically consequentialist conclusions (eg, “Better to save more lives”)’ (Greene, 2007, p. 39).
According to Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, & Hütter (2017, p. 365), ‘a given judgment cannot be categorized
as [consequentialist] without confirming its property of being sensitive to consequences.’
characteristically deontological : According to Greene, a judgement is characteristically deontological
if it is one in
‘favor of characteristically deontological conclusions (eg, “It’s wrong despite the benefits”)’ (Greene, 2007, p. 39).
According to Gawronski et al. (2017, p. 365), ‘a given judgment cannot be categorized
as deontological without confirming its property of being sensitive to
moral norms.’
cognitively efficient : A process is cognitively efficient to the degree that it does not consume working
memory and other scarce cognitive resources.
construct : A factor postulated by a theory with the aim of explaining patterns of behaviour.
Examples of constructs include moral conviction, moral disengagement and the moral foundations
from Moral Foundations Theory.
David : ‘David is a great transplant surgeon. Five of his patients need new parts—one
needs a heart, the others need, respectively, liver, stomach, spleen, and
spinal cord—but all are of the same, relatively rare, blood-type. By chance,
David learns of a healthy specimen with that very blood-type. David can take
the healthy specimen's parts, killing him, and install them in his patients,
saving them. Or he can refrain from taking the healthy specimen's parts,
letting his patients die’
(Thomson, 1976, p. 206).
debunking argument : A debunking argument aims to use
facts about why people make a certain judgement
together with
facts about which factors are morally relevant
in order to undermine the case for
accepting it. Königs (2020, p. 2607) provides a
useful outline of the logic of these arguments (which he calls
‘arguments from moral irrelevance’):
‘when we have different intuitions about similar moral cases, we take this
to indicate that there is a moral difference between these cases. This is
because we take our intuitions to have responded to a morally relevant
difference. But if it turns out that our case-specific intuitions are
responding to a factor that lacks moral significance, we no longer have reason
to trust our case-specific intuitions suggesting that there really is a moral
difference. This is the basic logic behind arguments from moral irrelevance’
(Königs, 2020, p. 2607).
distal outcome : The outcomes of an action can be partially ordered by the cause-effect
relation. For one outcome to be more distal than another is for it to
be lower with respect to that partial ordering. To illustrate, if you kick
a ball through a window, the window’s breaking is a more distal outcome than
the kicking.
doctrine of double effect : ‘the thesis that it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend’ (Foot, 1967, p. 7).
domain specific : A process is domain specific to the extent that there are limits on the range of functions
its outputs typically serve. Domain-specific processes are commonly contrasted with general-purpose
processes.
Drop : A dilemma; also known as Footbridge. A runaway trolley is about to run over and kill five people.
You can hit a switch that will release the bottom of a footbridge and
one person will fall onto the track. The trolley will hit this person,
slow down, and not hit the five people further down the track.
Is it okay to hit the switch?
dual-process theory : Any theory concerning abilities in a particular domain on which those
abilities involve two or more processes which are distinct in this sense:
the conditions which influence whether one mindreading process occurs differ
from the conditions which influence whether another occurs.
Edward : ‘Edward is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed. On the
track ahead of him are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not
be able to get off the track in time. The track has a spur leading off to
the right, and Edward can turn the trolley onto it. Unfortunately there is
one person on the right-hand track. Edward can turn the trolley, killing the
one; or he can refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five’
(Thomson, 1976, p. 206).
Far Alone : ‘I alone know that in a distant part of a
foreign country that I
am visiting, many children are drowning, and I alone can save one of them.
To save the one, all I must do is put the 500 dollars I carry in my pocket into a
machine that then triggers (via electric current) rescue machinery that will
certainly scoop him out’
(Kamm, 2008, p. 348)
fast : A fast process is one that is to
to some interesting degree cognitively efficient
(and therefore likely also some interesting degree automatic).
These processes are also sometimes
characterised as able to yield rapid responses.
Since automaticity and cognitive efficiency are matters of degree, it is only strictly correct to identify some processes as faster than others.
The fast-slow distinction has been variously characterised in ways that do not entirely overlap (even individual author have offered differing characterisations at different times; e.g. Kahneman, 2013; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Kahneman, 2002): as its advocates stress, it is a rough-and-ready tool rather than an element in a rigorous theory.
Since automaticity and cognitive efficiency are matters of degree, it is only strictly correct to identify some processes as faster than others.
The fast-slow distinction has been variously characterised in ways that do not entirely overlap (even individual author have offered differing characterisations at different times; e.g. Kahneman, 2013; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Kahneman, 2002): as its advocates stress, it is a rough-and-ready tool rather than an element in a rigorous theory.
foundation : I am unsure what exactly a moral foundation is; my rough working assumption is that
a foundation is an area of concern.
The proponents of Moral Foundations Theory are clear on
what makes something a moral foundation? It is
‘(a) being common in third-party normative judgments,
(b) automatic affective evaluations,
(c) cultural ubiquity though not necessarily universality,
(d) evidence of innate preparedness, and
(e) a robust preexisting evolutionary model’
(Atari et al., 2023, p. 1158).
Frank : ‘Frank is a passenger on a trolley whose driver has just shouted that the
trolley's brakes have failed, and who then died of the shock. On the track
ahead are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get
off the track in time. The track has a spur leading off to the right, and
Frank can turn the trolley onto it. Unfortunately there is one person on the
right-hand track. Frank can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can
refrain from turning the trolley, letting the five die’
(Thomson, 1976, p. 207).
Heinz : ‘In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind
of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It
was a form of radium for which a druggist was charging ten times what the
drug cost him to make. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he
knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about half of what
it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell
it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, “No, I discovered
the drug and I’m going to make money from it.” So, Heinz got desperate and
broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife. The druggist had
Heinz arrested and charged.’
(McHugh et al., 2023, p. supplementary materials; based on Haidt et al., 2000)
heuristic : A heuristic links an inaccessible attribute to an accessible attribute such that, within a limited but useful range of situations, someone could track the inaccessible attribute by computing the accessible attribute.
inaccessible : An attribute is inaccessible in a context just if it is difficult or impossible,
in that context, to discern substantive truths about that attribute. For example,
in ordinary life and for most people the attribute being further from Kilmery (in Wales) than
Steve’s brother Matt is would be inaccessible.
See Kahneman & Frederick (2005, p. 271): ‘We adopt the term accessibility to refer to the ease (or effort) with which particular mental contents come to mind.’
See Kahneman & Frederick (2005, p. 271): ‘We adopt the term accessibility to refer to the ease (or effort) with which particular mental contents come to mind.’
Incest : ‘Julie and Mark, who are brother and sister, are travelling together in France.
They are both on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying
alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and
fun if they tried making love. At very least it would be a new experience for
each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a
condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy it, but they decide not to do it
again. They keep that night as a special secret between them, which makes them
feel even closer to each other’
(McHugh et al., 2023, p. supplementary materials; based on Haidt et al., 2000)
individual foundations : Categories of moral concern linked to individual needs; these are often taken to be
harm/care, cheating/fairness (Graham et al., 2011). Sometimes called individualizing foundations.
informational encapsulation : One process is informationally encapsulated from some other processes to the extent that
there are limits on the one process’ ability to consume information available to the other processes.
(See Fodor, 1983; Clarke, 2020, p. 5ff.)
innate : Not learned.
While everyone disagrees about what innateness is (see
Samuels, 2004), on this course a cognitive ability is innate just
if its developmental emergence is not a direct consequence of data-driven
learning.
intuition : According to this lecturer, a person’s intuitions are the claims they take to be true
independently of whether those claims are justified inferentially. (Other sources may
define this term differently.)
loose reconstruction : (of an argument). A reconstruction which prioritises finding a correct argument
for a significant conclusion over faithfully representing the argument being reconstructed.
module : A module is standardly characterised as a cognitive system which exhibits, to a significant degree,
a set of features including domain specificity,
limited accessibility, and informational encapsulation.
Contemporary interest in modularity stems from Fodor (1983). Note that there are now a wide
range of incompatible views on what modules are and little agreement among researchers on what
modules are or even which features are characteristic of them.
moral conviction : ‘Moral conviction refers to a strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral’ (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005, p. 896).
moral disengagement : Moral disengagement occurs when self-sanctions are disengaged from
conduct. To illustrate, an executioner may avoid self-sanctioning for killing
by reframing the role they play as ‘babysitting’ (Bandura, 2002, p. 103).
Bandura (2002, p. 111) identifies several
mechanisms of moral disengagement: ‘The disengagement may centre on
redefining harmful conduct as honourable by moral justification, exonerating
social comparison and sanitising language. It may focus on agency of action
so that perpetrators can minimise their role in causing harm by diffusion
and displacement of responsibility. It may involve minimising or distorting
the harm that follows from detrimental actions; and the disengagement may
include dehumanising and blaming the victims of the maltreatment.’
moral dumbfounding : ‘the stubborn and puzzled maintenance of an [ethical] judgment without supporting reasons’ (Haidt et al., 2000, p. 1). As McHugh, McGann, Igou, & Kinsella (2017) note, subsequent researchers have given different definitions of moral dumbfounding so that ‘there is [currently] no single, agreed definition of moral dumbfounding.’ I adopt the original authors’ definition, as should you unless there are good reasons to depart from it.
Moral Foundations Theory : The theory that moral pluralism is true; moral foundations are innate but also subject to
cultural learning, and the Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement is correct (Graham et al., 2019).
Proponents often claim, further, that cultural variation in how these innate foundations
are woven into ethical abilities
can be measured using the Moral Foundations Questionnare
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011).
Some empirical objections have been offered (Davis et al., 2016; Davis, Dooley, Hook, Choe, & McElroy, 2017; Doğruyol, Alper, & Yilmaz, 2019).
See Moral Foundations Theory: An Approach to Cultural Variation.
moral intuition : According to this lecturer, a person’s intuitions are the claims they take to be true
independently of whether those claims are justified inferentially. And a person’s moral intuitions are
simply those of their intuitions that concern ethical matters.
According to Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2010, p. 256), moral intuitions are ‘strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs.’
According to Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2010, p. 256), moral intuitions are ‘strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs.’
moral pluralism : Descriptive moral pluralism is the view that humans’ ethical abilities involve distinct moral concerns (such as harm, equality and purity) which are not reducible to just one moral concern.
moral psychology : The study of ethical abilities. These include abilities to act in accordance with ethical considerations, to make ethical judgments, to exercise moral suasion, and to feel things in response to unethical or superordinate acts.
moral reframing : ‘A technique in which a position an individual would not normally support is
framed in a way that it is consistent with that individual's moral values.
[...] In the political arena, moral reframing involves arguing in favor of a
political position that members of a political group would not normally support
in terms of moral concerns that the members strongly ascribe to‘
(Feinberg & Willer, 2019, pp. 2--3).
moral sense : A ‘tendency to see certain actions and individuals as right, good, and
deserving of reward, and others as wrong, bad, and deserving of punishment’ (Hamlin, 2013, p. 186).
Near Alone : ‘I am walking past a pond in a foreign country that I am
visiting. I alone see many children drowning in it, and I alone can save one
of them.
To save the one, I must put the 500 dollars I have in my pocket into a machine
that then triggers (via electric current) rescue machinery that will certainly
scoop him out’
(Kamm, 2008, p. 348)
not-justified-inferentially : A claim (or premise, or principle) is not-justified-inferentially if it is not
justified in virtue of being inferred from some other claim (or premise, or principle).
Claims made on the basis of perception (That jumper is red, say) are typically not-justified-inferentially.
Why not just say ‘noninferentially justified’? Because that can be read as implying that the claim is justified, noninferentially. Whereas ‘not-justified-inferentially’ does not imply this. Any claim which is not justified at all is thereby not-justified-inferentially.
Claims made on the basis of perception (That jumper is red, say) are typically not-justified-inferentially.
Why not just say ‘noninferentially justified’? Because that can be read as implying that the claim is justified, noninferentially. Whereas ‘not-justified-inferentially’ does not imply this. Any claim which is not justified at all is thereby not-justified-inferentially.
proximal outcome : The outcomes of an action can be partially ordered by the cause-effect
relation. For one outcome to be more proximal than another is for it to
be higher with respect to that partial ordering. To illustrate, if you kick
a ball through a window, the kicking is a more proximal outcome than
the window’s breaking.
reflective equilibrium : A method that is supposed to provide justification for claims. The idea is to gather considered judgements about particular situations and attempt to identify principles which from which those judgements could be inferred, and then to adjust the judgements and principles so that they cohere. The canonical statement is Rawls (1999) (but Rawls, 1951 is a useful earlier statement). Authoritative secondary sources are Knight (2023) and Scanlon (2002).
replicate an experiment : To replicate a experiment is to attempt to repeat it with the aim of reproducing the original findings.
Where the original findings are not found, it is called a failed replication.
A replication can be more or less direct; that is, it may adhere very closely to the original experiment, or it may include varations in the stimuli, subjects and settings. Very indirect replications are sometimes called conceptual replications.
A replication can be more or less direct; that is, it may adhere very closely to the original experiment, or it may include varations in the stimuli, subjects and settings. Very indirect replications are sometimes called conceptual replications.
self-evident : ‘self-evident propositions
are truths meeting two conditions: (1) in
virtue of adequately understanding them, one has justification for believing
them [...]; and (2) believing them on the basis of adequately
understanding them entails knowing them’ (Audi, 2015, p. 65).
signature limit : A signature limit of a system is a pattern of behaviour the system exhibits which is both defective given what the system is for and peculiar to that system.
A signature limit of a model is a set of predictions derivable from the model which
are incorrect, and which are not predictions of other models under consideration.
Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement : A model on which intuitive processes are directly responsible for moral judgements (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008).
One’s own reasoning does not typically affect one’s own moral judgements,
but (outside philosophy, perhaps) is typically used only to provide post-hoc justification
after moral judgements are made.
Reasoning does affect others’ moral intuitions, and so provides a mechanism for cultural learning.
tracking an attribute : For a process to track an attribute is for the presence or absence of the attribute
to make a difference to how the process unfolds,
where this is not an accident. (And for a system or device to track an attribute is for some process
in that system or device to track it.)
Tracking an attribute is contrasted with computing it. Unlike tracking, computing typically requires that the attribute be represented. (The distinction between tracking and computing is a topic of Moral Intuitions and an Affect Heuristic.)
Tracking an attribute is contrasted with computing it. Unlike tracking, computing typically requires that the attribute be represented. (The distinction between tracking and computing is a topic of Moral Intuitions and an Affect Heuristic.)
Transplant : A dilemma. Five people are going to die but you can save them all by
cutting up one healthy person and distributing her organs.
Is it ok to cut her up?
Trolley : A dilemma; also known as Switch. A runaway trolley is about to run over
and kill five people.
You can hit a switch that will divert the trolley onto a different set of tracks
where it will kill only one.
Is it okay to hit the switch?
trolley cases : Scenarios designed to elicit puzzling or informative patterns of judgement about
how someone should act. Examples include Trolley, Transplant, and Drop.
Their use was pioneered by Foot (1967) and
Thomson (1976), who aimed to use them to understand ethical considerations
around abortion and euthanasia.
trolley problem : ‘Why is it that Edward may turn that trolley to save his five, but David
may not cut up his healthy specimen to save his five?’
(Thomson, 1976, p. 206).
unfamiliar problem : An unfamiliar problem (or situation) is one ‘with which we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience’ (Greene, 2014, p. 714).
useful construct : A useful construct is one that can explain an interesting range of target phenomena.
valid construct : For the purposes of this course, a valid construct is one that can be measured using a tool (often a questionnaire)
where there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the tool measures the construct.
When used for cross-cultural comparisons, the tool should exhibit metric and scalar
invariance (i.e. it should measure the same construct in the same way irrespective of which
the culture participant belongs to).
Note that the term ‘construct validity’ is used in many different ways. It is probably best to try to understand it case-by-case—each time the term occurs, ask yourself what the researchers are claiming to have shown. If you do want an overview, Drost (2011) is one source.
Note that the term ‘construct validity’ is used in many different ways. It is probably best to try to understand it case-by-case—each time the term occurs, ask yourself what the researchers are claiming to have shown. If you do want an overview, Drost (2011) is one source.
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