Moral Foundations Theory Reprise
How well supported are the claims of Moral Foundations Theory (see Moral Foundations Theory: An Approach to Cultural Variation)
by the discoveries we have encountered?
And how does Moral Foundations Theory relate to
our stripped-down dual-process theory (see A Dual Process Theory of Ethical Judgement)?
Essay Question
This
section
is relevant for answering the following question:
Notes
Objections to Moral Foundations Theory
The main theoretical objection to Moral Foundations Theory arises from
moral disengagement (Bandura, 2002; see Moral Disengagement: The Theory),
which shows that moral judgements are sometimes (indirectly, perhaps) a consequence of reasoning.
This is incompatible with the Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement, which is one
component of Moral Foundations Theory.
This theoretical objection matters for interpreting the results of studies using the
Moral Foundations Questionnaire. For the objection implies, contra Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement,
that moral judgements are not a function only of moral foundations and cultural learning.
The main empirical objection to Moral Foundations Theory arises from the multiple failures
of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (version 1) to exhibit scalar invariance (see Operationalising Moral Foundations Theory
and The Argument and Some Objections).
A Hybrid Theory?
Moral Foundations Theory and our stripped-down dual-process theory
are incompatible. Most clearly because Moral Foundations Theory includes a one-process theory
of moral judgement.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to combine components of the two theories.
This could be advantageous for both sides.
From the point of view of Moral Foundations Theory, mixing in a dual-process theory
could suggest new ways to discover
evidence for cultural variation that do not depend on the Moral Foundations Questionnaire
(such as process dissociation; see Moral Reframing and Process Dissociation).
From the point of view of our dual-process theory, taking moral pluralism seriously may
help in getting beyond relying too heavily on a crude and not-well-supported-by-evidence distinction between
characteristically consequentialist and characteristically deontological judgements.
But how to combine the two theories is not obvious. What might a hybrid theory look like?
Glossary
characteristically consequentialist :
According to Greene, a judgement is characteristically consequentialist
(or characteristically utilitarian) if it is one in
‘favor of characteristically consequentialist conclusions (eg, “Better to save more lives”)’ (Greene, 2007, p. 39).
According to Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, & Hütter (2017, p. 365), ‘a given judgment cannot be categorized
as [consequentialist] without confirming its property of being sensitive to consequences.’
characteristically deontological :
According to Greene, a judgement is characteristically deontological
if it is one in
‘favor of characteristically deontological conclusions (eg, “It’s wrong despite the benefits”)’ (Greene, 2007, p. 39).
According to Gawronski et al. (2017, p. 365), ‘a given judgment cannot be categorized
as deontological without confirming its property of being sensitive to
moral norms.’
dual-process theory :
Any theory concerning abilities in a particular domain on which those
abilities involve two or more processes which are distinct in this sense:
the conditions which influence whether one mindreading process occurs differ
from the conditions which influence whether another occurs.
Moral Foundations Theory :
The theory that moral pluralism is true; moral foundations are innate but also subject to
cultural learning, and the Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement is correct (Graham et al., 2019).
Proponents often claim, further, that cultural variation in how these innate foundations
are woven into ethical abilities
can be measured using the Moral Foundations Questionnare
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011).
Some empirical objections have been offered (Davis et al., 2016; Davis, Dooley, Hook, Choe, & McElroy, 2017; Doğruyol, Alper, & Yilmaz, 2019).
See Moral Foundations Theory: An Approach to Cultural Variation.
moral pluralism :
Descriptive moral pluralism is the view that humans’ ethical abilities involve distinct moral concerns (such as harm, equality and purity) which are not reducible to just one moral concern.
Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement :
A model on which intuitive processes are directly responsible for moral judgements (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008).
One’s own reasoning does not typically affect one’s own moral judgements,
but (outside philosophy, perhaps) is typically used only to provide post-hoc justification
after moral judgements are made.
Reasoning does affect others’ moral intuitions, and so provides a mechanism for cultural learning.
References
Bandura, A. (2002). Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency.
Journal of Moral Education,
31(2), 101–119.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724022014322Davis, D., Dooley, M., Hook, J., Choe, E., & McElroy, S. (2017). The Purity/Sanctity Subscale of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire Does Not Work Similarly for Religious Versus Non-Religious Individuals.
Psychology of Religion and Spirituality,
9(1), 124–130.
https://doi.org/10.1037/rel0000057Davis, D., Rice, K., Tongeren, D. V., Hook, J., DeBlaere, C., Worthington, E., & Choe, E. (2016). The Moral Foundations Hypothesis Does Not Replicate Well in Black Samples.
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