Introduction to Part II: Do Cultural Differences in Moral Psychology Explain Political Conflict on Climate Change?
In Part II of this course we will consider how, if at all, discoveries in moral
psychology can inform an understanding of political conflict and routes to
their democratic resolution.
Notes
In Part II of this course we will consider how, if at all, discoveries in moral
psychology can inform an understanding of political conflict and routes to
their democratic resolution.
Although Part II is related to Part I, I will present it as a fresh start.
Nearly all of it should make sense independently of anything you learned in Part I.
We will focus on political conflict over climate change. This is also the part of the
course where we will consider cultural differences in moral psychology.
The overall question for Part II is,
Do cultural differences in moral psychology explain political conflict on climate change?
Fact to Be Explained
People who identify as socially liberal rather than socially conservative
are less likely to deny facts about anthropogenic climate change and
more likely to express concern about the effects of climate change.
This is true in many, but not all, countries. The US is an extreme case,
as the Republican Party denies anthropogenic climate change
and has published a manifesto criticizing Democrats for treating it as a severe threat
(Båtstrand, 2015).
Although few mainstream political parties are so extreme,
the split between liberal and conservative voters exists in many countries:
‘Recent research finds a notable political cleavage on climate change views within
the general publics of the United States, Australia, Canada, the UK, and a range of other
countries around the world,
with citizens on the left reporting greater belief in, concern about, and support
for action on climate change than citizens on the right do. [...]
such an ideological divide on climate change views was not found among the
general publics of former Communist countries,
[...] the ‘post-Communist effect.’
(McCright, Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016, p. 351)
Simplified Preview
We will approach this topic by working through Feinberg & Willer (2013).
In outline, Feinberg and Willer argue that cultural differences in moral psychology
do explain political conflict on climate change on the basis of five considerations.
These five are considerations are:
- ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’ (see Do Ethical Attitudes Shape Political Behaviours?)
- There are at least two foundational domains of human morality, including harm and purity. Also, Moral Foundations Theory is true (see Moral Pluralism: Beyond Harm; Moral Foundations Theory: An Approach to Cultural Variation; and Operationalising Moral Foundations Theory)
- ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’ (see Liberals vs Conservatives)
- ‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do
conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental
issues in moral terms’
- ‘exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns
that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral
terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’
We will examine each consideration in turn.
The lectures use Feinberg & Willer (2013) as a guide.
Another good source for an overview of the issues is Markowitz & Shariff (2012).
Glossary
moral conviction :
‘Moral conviction refers to a strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral’ (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005, p. 896). We take the convictions and beliefs
to be attitudes.
moral disengagement :
Moral disengagement occurs when self-sanctions are disengaged from
conduct. To illustrate, an executioner may avoid self-sanctioning for killing
by reframing the role they play as ‘babysitting’ (Bandura, 2002, p. 103).
Bandura (2002, p. 111) identifies several
mechanisms of moral disengagement: ‘The disengagement may centre on
redefining harmful conduct as honourable by moral justification, exonerating
social comparison and sanitising language. It may focus on agency of action
so that perpetrators can minimise their role in causing harm by diffusion
and displacement of responsibility. It may involve minimising or distorting
the harm that follows from detrimental actions; and the disengagement may
include dehumanising and blaming the victims of the maltreatment.’
Moral Foundations Theory :
The theory that moral pluralism is true; moral foundations are innate but also subject to
cultural learning, and the Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement is correct (Graham et al., 2019).
Proponents often claim, further, that cultural variation in how these innate foundations
are woven into ethical abilities
can be measured using the Moral Foundations Questionnare
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011).
Some empirical objections have been offered (Davis et al., 2016; Davis, Dooley, Hook, Choe, & McElroy, 2017; Doğruyol, Alper, & Yilmaz, 2019).
See Moral Foundations Theory: An Approach to Cultural Variation.
Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement :
A model on which intuitive processes are directly responsible for moral judgements (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008).
One’s own reasoning does not typically affect one’s own moral judgements,
but (outside philosophy, perhaps) is typically used only to provide post-hoc justification
after moral judgements are made.
Reasoning does affect others’ moral intuitions, and so provides a mechanism for cultural learning.
References
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