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Dual Process Theories: Objections, Evidence and Significance

A brief introduction to the three topics of this lecture.

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Notes

This week’s lecture builds on Lecture 07. Although you don’t need to understand everything in that lecture, most of this week’s lecture is about the loose reconstruction of Greene (2014)’s argument (see Greene contra Ethics (Railgun Remix)).

This lecture covers three issues:

  1. Significance and Extensions (Against Reflective Equilibrium, Appendix: Dual Process Theory and Auxiliary Hypotheses and Appendix Ethical Implications of the Dual Process Theory)

  2. Theoretical Objections to Greene’s Argument (none of them work, but perhaps you can do better)

  3. Evidence for Dual Process Theories

We will also have to consider evidence against the dual process theory of moral psychology, but that is a topic for next week.

Glossary

loose reconstruction : (of an argument). A reconstruction which prioritises finding a correct argument for a significant conclusion over faithfully representing the argument being reconstructed.

References

Audi, R. (2015). Intuition and Its Place in Ethics. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(1), 57–77. http://0-dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1017/apa.2014.29
Cappelen, H. (2012). Philosophy Without Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greene, J. D. (2014). Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics. Ethics, 124(4), 695–726. https://doi.org/10.1086/675875
Railton, P. (2014). The Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement. Ethics, 124(4), 813–859. https://doi.org/10.1086/675876