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Question 3:

EITHER:

What challenge, if any, to theories of ethical judgement is posed by the possibility of moral dumbfounding?

OR:

What challenge, if any, to theories of ethical judgement is posed by the possibility of moral disengagement?

OR (most ambitious?):

What challenge, if any, to theories of ethical judgement is posed by the twin possibilities of moral dumbfounding and moral disengagement?

Hints

State which of the three questions (above) you are answering. (Do not write an essay titled ‘On moral dumbfonding and moral disengagement’! That is not a question.)

Whichever question you attempt, be sure to answer with respect to a single theory of ethical judgement. Although several such theories were cited in the lecture notes linked below, the theory you most likely want to consider is Haidt & Bjorklund (2008)’s.

Please also follow the general instructions for Short Essay Questions.

Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following lecture contain material relevant to answering this question.

Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

Further Reading

Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading.

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

Glossary

ethical judgement : For a claim to be among a person’s judgements is for them to take it to be true. An ethical judgement is just a judgement involving something ethical. (Same as moral judgement.)
moral disengagement : Moral disengagement occurs when self-sanctions are disengaged from conduct. To illustrate, an executioner may avoid self-sanctioning for killing by reframing the role they play as ‘babysitting’ (Bandura, 2002, p. 103). Bandura (2002, p. 111) identifies several mechanisms of moral disengagement: ‘The disengagement may centre on redefining harmful conduct as honourable by moral justification, exonerating social comparison and sanitising language. It may focus on agency of action so that perpetrators can minimise their role in causing harm by diffusion and displacement of responsibility. It may involve minimising or distorting the harm that follows from detrimental actions; and the disengagement may include dehumanising and blaming the victims of the maltreatment.’
moral dumbfounding : ‘the stubborn and puzzled maintenance of an [ethical] judgment without supporting reasons’ (Haidt et al., 2000, p. 1). As McHugh et al. (2017) note, subsequent researchers have given different definitions of moral dumbfounding so that ‘there is [currently] no single, agreed definition of moral dumbfounding.’ I adopt the original authors’ definition, as should you unless there are good reasons to depart from it.
theory of ethical judgement : A psychological theory which explains how people arrive at ethical judgements. For example, Haidt & Bjorklund (2008, p. 189)’s Social Intuitionist Model is a theory of ethical judgement.

References

Bandura, A. (2002). Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency. Journal of Moral Education, 31(2), 101–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724022014322
Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G., & Pastorelli, C. (1996). Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(2), 364–374. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.364
Haidt, J., & Bjorklund, F. (2008). Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology, Vol 2: The cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity (pp. 181–217). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT press.
Haidt, J., Bjorklund, F., & Murphy, S. (2000). Moral dumbfounding: When intuition finds no reason. Unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia.
Hindriks, F. (2014). Intuitions, Rationalizations, and Justification: A Defense of Sentimental Rationalism. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 48(2), 195–216. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9419-z
McAlister, A. L., Bandura, A., & Owen, S. V. (2006). Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Support of Military Force: The Impact of Sept. 11. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 25(2), 141–165. https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2006.25.2.141
McHugh, C., McGann, M., Igou, E. R., & Kinsella, E. L. (2017). Searching for Moral Dumbfounding: Identifying Measurable Indicators of Moral Dumbfounding. Collabra: Psychology, 3(1), 23. https://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.79
Osofsky, M. J., Bandura, A., & Zimbardo, P. G. (2005). The Role of Moral Disengagement in the Execution Process. Law and Human Behavior, 29(4), 371–393. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-005-4930-1
Royzman, E. B., Kim, K., & Leeman, R. F. (2015). The curious tale of julie and mark: Unraveling the moral dumbfounding effect. Judgment & Decision Making, 10(4).