Question 4: What are framing effects? Where philosophers’ ethical claims are influenced by framing effects, should those claims be disregarded?

Hints

Answers to the second question are provided by Rini (2013) and Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Your essay may focus on providing a critical evaluation of either of their arguments.

Please also follow the general instructions for Long Essay Questions.

Lecture Notes

This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.

The following section contain material relevant to answering this question.

Framing Effects: Emotion and Order of Presentation

Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

Rini (2013)

Schwitzgebel & Cushman (2015)

Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading.

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

References

Rini, R. A. (2013). Making psychology normatively significant. The Journal of Ethics, 17(3), 257–274.

Rini, R. A. (2017). Why moral psychology is disturbing. Philosophical Studies, 174(6), 1439–1458. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0766-4

Schwitzgebel, E., & Cushman, F. (2015). Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection. Cognition, 141, 127–137. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.015

Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Framing Moral Intuitions. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology: Intuition and diversity. The cognitive science of morality (Vol. 2, pp. 47–76). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wiegmann, A., & Horvath, J. (2021). Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgements. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 100(2), 342–359. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1890162