Question 3: What do dual-process theories of moral cognition claim? Is there sufficient evidence to accept, or reject, such a theory?

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Lecture Notes

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The following lecture contain material relevant to answering this question.

Lecture 08

The following section contain material relevant to answering this question.

A Dual Process Theory of Ethical Judgement

Reading

If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).

Cushman (2013)

Greene (2014)

Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen (2008)

Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading.

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

References

Cushman, F. (2013). Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 17(3), 273–292. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868313495594

Gawronski, B., Armstrong, J., Conway, P., Friesdorf, R., & Hütter, M. (2017). Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas: The CNI model of moral decision-making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 113(3), 343–376. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000086

Greene, J. D. (2014). Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics. Ethics, 124(4), 695–726. https://doi.org/10.1086/675875

Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 107(3), 1144–1154. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004

Kumar, V. (2016). The empirical identity of moral judgment. The Philosophical Quarterly, 66(265), 783–804.