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The CNI Model: Beyond Trolley/Transplant

1. There is a puzzle about apparently inconsistent patterns in judgement (switch-drop).

2. We can solve the puzzle by invoking a dual-process theory ...

2.a ... where one process is faster; and

2.b the faster process is affective and

2.c less consequentialist.

3. The faster process is unlikely to be reliable in unfamiliar* situations.

4. Therefore, we should rely less on the faster (and less consequentialist) process in unfamiliar* situations.

We will consider this claim

old: switch vs footbridge

new : CNI contrast (separately manipulate outcomes and norms (proscription/prescription))

\citep{gawronski:2017_consequences}

Not consequentialist = deontological?

‘a given judgment cannot be categorized as utilitarian without confirming its property of being sensitive to consequences, which requires a comparison of judgments across dilemmas with different consequences. Similarly, a given judgment cannot be categorized as deontological without confirming its property of being sensitive to moral norms, which requires a comparison of judgments across dilemmas with different moral norms’

\citep[p.~365]{gawronski:2017_consequences}.

Gawronski et al, 2017 p. 365

Gawronski et al, 2017 figure 1

Gawronski et al, 2017 figure 4

‘The only significant effect in these studies was a significant increase in participants’ general preference for inaction as a result of cognitive load. Cognitive load did not affect participants’ sensitivity to morally relevant consequences’

\citep[p.~363]{gawronski:2017_consequences}.

‘cognitive load influences moral dilemma judgments by enhancing the omission bias, not by reducing sensitivity to consequences in a utilitarian sense’

\citep[p.~363]{gawronski:2017_consequences}.

‘Instead of reducing participants’ sensitivity to consequences in a utilitarian sense, cognitive load increased participants’ general preference for inaction. ’

\citep[p.~365]{gawronski:2017_consequences}.

Gawronski et al, 2017 p. 363

1. There is a puzzle about apparently inconsistent patterns in judgement (switch-drop).

2. We can solve the puzzle by invoking a dual-process theory ...

2.a ... where one process is faster; and

2.b the faster process is affective and

2.c less consequentialist.

3. The faster process is unlikely to be reliable in unfamiliar* situations.

4. Therefore, we should rely less on the faster (and less consequentialist) process in unfamiliar* situations.

We have been considering this claim, findings from the CNI Model speak against it

faster = less consequentialist?

Suter & Hertwig, 2011 : yes

Bago & de Neys, 2019 : no

Gawronski et al, 2017 : no

Can we resolve the apparent contradiction by preference for inaction under time-pressure?

I don’t see how. Both studies used nonconsequentialist = deontological. So any preference for inaction under time-pressure should have had the same effect in both studies!
These studies’ results appear to confict (time-pressure does/doesn't make people less consequentialist)
These studies’ results appear to confict (time-pressure has barely any effect / does make people less consequentialist [because prefer inaction])

1. There is a puzzle about apparently inconsistent patterns in judgement (switch-drop).

2. We can solve the puzzle by invoking a dual-process theory ...

2.a ... where one process is faster; and

2.b the faster process is affective and

2.c less consequentialist.

3. The faster process is unlikely to be reliable in unfamiliar* situations.

4. Therefore, we should rely less on the faster (and less consequentialist) process in unfamiliar* situations.

We have been considering this claim, findings from the CNI Model speak against it