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Hypothesis: Not all unreflective moral judgements depend on reasoning.
What is moral dumbfounding?
Haidt et al (2000; unpublished!)’s tasks
Control: ‘Heinz dilemma (should Heinz steal a drug to save his dying wife?)’
morally provocative but ‘harmless’: Incest; Cannibal
nonmorally provocative but ‘harmless’: Roach; Soul
Method: ask whether wrong; counter argue; questionnaire
Haidt et al (2000; unpublished!)’s tasks
Control: ‘Heinz dilemma (should Heinz steal a drug to save his dying wife?)’
morally provocative but ‘harmless’: Incest; Cannibal
nonmorally provocative but ‘harmless’: Roach; Soul
Method: ask whether wrong; counter argue; questionnaire
Results
NB: unpublished data
‘it often happened that participants made “unsupported declarations”, e.g., “It’s just wrong to do that!” or “That’s terrible!”
They made the fewest such declarations in Heinz, and they made significantly more such declarations in the Incest story.’
Results ctd
NB: unpublished data
Informal observation: ‘participants often directly stated that they were dumbfounded, i.e., they made a statement to the effect that they thought an action was wrong but they could not find the words to explain themselves’ (p. 9)
‘Participants made the fewest such statements in Heinz (only 2 such statements, from 2 participants), while they made significantly more such statements in the Incest (38 statements from 23 different participants), Cannibalism (24 from 11), and Soul stories (22 from 13).’
Study 2 (not reported!):
Cognitive load increased the level of moral dumbfounding without changing subjects’ judgments.
replication / extension / review?
‘a definitionally pristine bout of MD is likely to be a extraordinarily rare find, one featuring a person who doggedly and decisively condemns the very same act that she has no prior normative reasons to dislike’
Royzman et al, 2015 p. 311
‘3 of [...] 14 individuals [without supporting reasons] disapproved of the siblings having sex and only 1 of 3 (1.9%) maintained his disapproval in the “stubborn and puzzled” manner.’
Royzman et al, 2015 p. 309
Warning: Note the absent comparison with the Heinz dilemma.
summary: moral dumbfounding
we know the definition;
some evidence --- weak, but probably occurs.
why is this relevant?
Hypothesis: Not all unreflective moral judgements depend on reasoning.
Remember Heinz!
post-hoc rationalization
Moral reasoning merely serves to confirm prior intuitions, in nearly all cases (Haidt; Greene)
ante hoc reasoning
In ordinary cases of moral disengagement, moral reasoning provides anticipatory rationalization (Hindriks, 2015)
My view.
Moral dumbfounding shows that some ethical judgements are not consequences of reasoning from known principles
Other phenomena (e.g. moral disengagement) indicate that some ethical judgements are consequences of reasoning from known principles
puzzle 2
Why are ethical judgements sometimes, but not always, a consequence of reasoning from known principles?