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Dual Process Theories Meet the Puzzles

So far we encountered 2½ puzzles. Can a dual process theory help us to resolve the puzzles?

2½ puzzles

2½ rather than 3 because I'm not sure Structure and Dumbfounding are really distinct puzzles (nor is Emotion Puzzle really one puzzle, I suspect).

[emotion puzzle] Why do feelings of disgust influence unreflective moral judgements? (And why do we feel disgust in response to moral transgressions?)

[structure puzzle] Why do patterns in humans’ unreflective ethical judgements reflect legal principles they are unaware of?

[dumbfounding puzzle] Why are ethical judgements sometimes, but not always, a consequence of reasoning from known principles?

I think it is clear that our core dual process theory cannot solve them. The key is to elaborate on the nature of the processes.
So this is our dual process theory of ethical abilities.

Dual Process Theory of Ethical Abilities (core part)

Two (or more) ethical processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.

‘a dual-process approach in which moral judgment is the product of both intuitive and rational psychological processes, and it is the product of what are conventionally thought of as ‘affective’ and ‘cognitivemechanisms’

\citep[p.~48]{cushman:2010_multi}.

Cushman et al, 2010 p. 48

I like to think of this contrast in terms of demands on scarce cognitive resources.
Here is the link to emotion.
We can think of Cushman et al, 2010 as elaborating on the core dual process theory.

Dual Process Theory of Ethical Abilities (core part)

Two (or more) ethical processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.

And one of the processes is more intuitive than the other.

And the more intuitive process is driven by emotion.

Does this help us with the puzzles?
So far we encountered 2½ puzzles. Can a dual process theory help us to resolve the puzzles?

2½ puzzles

2½ rather than 3 because I'm not sure Structure and Dumbfounding are really distinct puzzles (nor is Emotion Puzzle really one puzzle, I suspect).

[emotion puzzle] Why do feelings of disgust influence unreflective moral judgements? (And why do we feel disgust in response to moral transgressions?)

[structure puzzle] Why do patterns in humans’ unreflective ethical judgements reflect legal principles they are unaware of?

[dumbfounding puzzle] Why are ethical judgements sometimes, but not always, a consequence of reasoning from known principles?

The dual process theory was just designed to resolve this puzzle.

Note: distinguish the core dual process theory from further claims.

Dual Process Theory of Ethical Abilities (core part)

Two (or more) ethical processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.

And one of the processes is more intuitive than the other.

And the more intuitive process is driven by emotion.

distinct processes rely on distinct neural circuits which can be spatially distinguished using fMRI

affective moral processes involve attribute substitution (i.e. heuristics)

You do not need to accept all claims in order to advocate a dual process theory.

dual process vs dual system?

‘We use the term “system” only as a label for collections of cognitive processes that can be distinguished by their speed, their controllability, and the contents on which they operate’

\citep[p.~267]{kahneman:2005_model}.

Kahneman & Fredrick, 2005 p. 267