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Cognitive Miracles

Greene (my reconstruction)

Drop is an unfamiliar* situation.

Spontaneous judgements are dominated by fast processes.

Fast processes are not reliable in unfamiliar* situations.

Therefore:

Spontaneous judgements concerning Drop are unreliable.

We will consider this claim

unfamiliar problems (or situations): ‘ones with which we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience’

Question for discussion: is the principle true or false?

‘it would be a cognitive miracle if we had reliably good moral instincts about unfamiliar* moral problems’

‘The No Cognitive Miracles Principle:

When we are dealing with unfamiliar* moral problems, we ought to rely less on [...] automatic emotional responses and more on [...] conscious, controlled reasoning, lest we bank on cognitive miracles.’

Greene, 2014 p. 715

ethical vs physical Compare processes underlying representational momentum Driven by principles So correct in at least two kinds of unfamiliar* cases

Compare the physical case.

Fast processes are characterised by principles of Impetus mechanics

which yield correct predictions in some unfamiliar* cases, including

point-light displays, and

(principles still work, despite unfamiliarity*)

cartoons

(stimuli are reverse-engineered to make the processes work)
Are these really unfamiliar?

unfamiliar problems (or situations): ‘ones with which we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience’

Inadequate for what? If we mean, ‘inadequate’ for learning about situations of that type, then the argument works formally, but it becomes a nontrivial issue whether the situation of Drop really is unfamiliar.
Dilemma: if we think of unfamiliarity as ‘unfamiliar in some respect’ then practically every situation and problem will be unfamiliar. But if we think of unfamiliarity as

Objection

Either Drop is unfamiliar but unfamiliarity does not imply unreliability of fast processes,

or else unfamiliarity does imply unreliability of fast processes but we lack grounds for determining whether Drop is familiar.

And finding those grounds will, essentially, collapse Greene’s argument into Singer’s.

Greene (my reconstruction)

Drop is an unfamiliar* situation.

Spontaneous judgements are dominated by fast processes.

Fast processes are not reliable in unfamiliar* situations.

Therefore:

Spontaneous judgements concerning Drop are unreliable.

Having considered this claim, I’m unsure we should accept it although open to the idea that a reformulated version of it could be acceptable.

reject the No Cognitive Miracles Principle outright?

Method of Signature Limits

1. Process generates prediction which is wrong ...

2. ... and which follows from principles that describe how the process works (its computational description).

This suggests thinking in terms of up-close and personal, which brings us to Singer’s argument.
Question for discussion now: can we save the principle?

‘it would be a cognitive miracle if we had reliably good moral instincts about unfamiliar* moral problems’

‘The No Cognitive Miracles Principle:

When we are dealing with unfamiliar* moral problems, we ought to rely less on [...] automatic emotional responses and more on [...] conscious, controlled reasoning, lest we bank on cognitive miracles.’

Greene, 2014 p. 715

Objection

Either Drop is unfamiliar but unfamiliarity does not imply unreliability of fast processes,

or else unfamiliarity does imply unreliability of fast processes but we lack grounds for determining whether Drop is familiar.

And finding those grounds will, essentially, collapse Greene’s argument into Singer’s.

Greene (my reconstruction)

Drop is an unfamiliar* situation.

Spontaneous judgements are dominated by fast processes.

Fast processes are not reliable in unfamiliar* situations.

Therefore:

Spontaneous judgements concerning Drop are unreliable.

Having considered this claim, I’m unsure we should accept it although open to the idea that a reformulated version of it could be acceptable.