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\title {Moral Psychology \\ Lecture 05}
 
\maketitle
 

Lecture 05:

Moral Psychology

\def \ititle {Lecture 05}
\def \isubtitle {Moral Psychology}
\begin{center}
{\Large
\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle
}
 
\iemail %
\end{center}
Current issue (Part II of lecture course)!

What do discoveries concerning human moral psychology imply for the feasibility of democratically mitigating climate change?

Plan:

Work through Feinberg & Willer, 2013 ‘The Moral Roots of Environmental Attitudes’

What are their background assumptions, and what is the evidence for them?
What is their theoretical framework?

The story so far ...

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

\citep{bolderdijk:2013_comparing}

Bolderdijk et al, 2013 figure 1

Study in US on who picks up a coupon for a free tire-pressure check from a billboard saying it will save money vs it will save the environment vs it will make you safe vs just ‘have one’ ( = control)
\citep{severson:2015_moral} also found that money doesn’t help, whereas ethical appeals do.

The story so far ...

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

otherself
harmImagine that Steven intentionally punched someone in the ribs.Imagine that Steven intentionally punched himself in the ribs.
purityImagine that Steven intentionally poured a cup of urine on someone's lap.Imagine that Steven intentionally poured a cup of urine on his own lap.

Chakroff et al, 2013 (Supplementary Materials)

\citep{chakroff:2013_harming}

Chakroff et al, 2013 figure 1b (part)

See \citep[p.~12]{dungan:2017_relevance} for a summary of ‘existing evidence for distinct cognitive processing of harm and purity violations. First, information about a violator’s intentions influence moral judgments of harm violations more than purity violations [...]. Second, purity violations, more so than harm violations, are attributed to dispositional versus situational factors [...] and strongly affect perceptions of the violator’s moral character’.

The story so far ...

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?

... whether or not someone was harmed?

... whether or not someone suffered emotionally

... whether or not someone did something disgusting

... whether or not someone did something unnatural or degrading

Graham et al, 2009

Graham et al, 2009 figure 1

The story so far ...

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

4

‘we hypothesized that liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms’

\citep[p.~2]{feinberg:2013_moral}

Feinberg & Willer, 2013 p. 2

Feinberg & Willer, 2013 figure 1

Fig. 1. Results from Study 1a: mean morality rating as a function of political ideology (liberal = 1 SD below the mean; conservative = 1 SD above the mean) and experimental condition. Error bars represent ±1 SEM.

4

‘we hypothesized that liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms’

\citep[p.~2]{feinberg:2013_moral}

Feinberg & Willer, 2013 p. 2

How do they justify this claim? I think the argument is indirect.

‘two distinct moral pathways that lead people to be more likely to express uncertainty and doubt about anthropogenic climate change’

1. binding foundations (in-group loyalty, deference to authority and purity).

2. liberty foundation (freedom from intervention)

‘these two pathways are distinct and uniquely predict climate change scepticism.

Rossen et al, 2015

\citep{rossen:2015_desire}.

4

‘we hypothesized that liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms’

\citep[p.~2]{feinberg:2013_moral}

Feinberg & Willer, 2013 p. 2

5

‘we hypothesized that exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’

\citep[p.~2]{feinberg:2013_moral}

Feinberg & Willer, 2013 p. 2

Background

Study 2: ‘Content analyses of environmental rhetoric from both video and print media revealed that such rhetoric resides primarily within the harm/care moral domain’

\citep[p.~4]{feinberg:2013_moral}

Feinberg & Willer, 2013 p. 4

From later study \citep{feinberg:2015_gulfa}
‘Table 1. Frequencies in Which Participants in Studies 1 and 2 Wrote Moral Arguments That Appealed to Their Own Moral Values, Appealed to The Targeted Group’s Moral Values, and Attacked The Targeted Group's Moral Values.’
Note that some participants attack their targets’ morality.
Note yes/no - yes row is for proportions who did fit with conservative morality &c; no row is for proportions who did not fit.
Significance: if one group sees an issue in moral terms and another doesn’t, then it is likely to get framed in terms of the first group’s ethical principles (perpetuates difference).
Instructions (to Liberals in Study 1): ‘Now, we would like you to write a persuasive argument (4-5 sentences) aimed at convincing conservative Americans who oppose same-sex marriage of why they should be in favor of same-sex marriage. Note: In a follow-up study, we will actually present your argument to conservative Americans who oppose same-sex marriage to see if they are persuaded by your argument. Participants who are able to effectively persuade these future study participants will be entered into a drawing for a $50 bonus.’

Feinberg & Willer, 2015 Table 1

Study 3 : read a persuasive message

‘Participants in the harm/care and purity/sanctity conditions read a persuasive message modeled after a newspaper op-ed. These messages utilized words typical of their respective moral domains (Graham et al., 2009). The harm/care message described the harm and destruction humans are causing to the environment and emphasized how important it is for people to care about and protect the environment. Participants in the purity/sanctity condition read about how polluted and contaminated the environment has become and how important it is for people to clean and purify the environment.’

’[harm/care] ... the harm and destruction humans are causing to the environment and emphasized how important it is for people to care about and protect the environment.’

‘[purity/sanctity] ... how polluted and contaminated the environment has become and how important it is for people to clean and purify the environment.’

Feinberg & Willer, 2013 figure 2

Fig. 2. Results from Study 3: mean proenvironmental attitude as a function of moral-messaging condition and political ideology (liberal = 1 SD below the mean; conservative = 1 SD above the mean). Asterisks indicate significant differences between groups (p < .001). Error bars represent ±1 SEM.

5

‘we hypothesized that exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’

\citep[p.~2]{feinberg:2013_moral}

Feinberg & Willer, 2013 p. 2

the argument

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

4. ‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms.’

5. ‘exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’

First discussion: is it entirely clear? (Not interested in whether it is correct. Clarification only!)

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

4. ‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms.’

5. ‘exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’

What do discoveries concerning human moral psychology imply for the feasibility of democratically mitigating climate change?

What do you think of the argument? Are there any points you object to? If so, do you think they show that the conclusion is wrong, or only that it is unsupported by this particular argument?
Or do you think the conclusion is strongly supported?
This is already significant. But can it also change how pepole act?
 
\section{Extending the Result}
 
\section{Extending the Result}

But can it change how people act?

Kidwell et al, 2013

Effects on behaviour, not just talk
‘we developed tailored persuasive messages that appealed to the individualizing foundations for liberals, based on fairness and avoiding harm to others, and the binding foundation for conservatives, based on duty and an obligation to adhere to authority. We found that these congruent appeals significantly affected consumers’ acquisition, usage, and recycling intentions and behaviors’ \citep{kidwell:2013_getting}.
[\citep{wolsko:2016_red} says these results are inconsistent with \citep{feinberg:2013_moral} ! But this is only because Kidwell et al find an effect on liberals too (cf Feinberg 2015 next study)]
These are from Study 4. (Study 2 included extraneous logos &c) ‘However, the “binding” conservative appeal displayed a patriotic image while the “individualizing” liberal appeal displayed a well-known charity (Habitat for Humanity).’

‘You can make a difference by recyling because you know it’s the right thing to do. Your actions can help care for others and allow the greatest good for society. Because of people like you, we can reduce the harm to others and to the environement by recycling. You CAN make a difference

‘You can join the fight by recycling with those like you in your community. Your actions can help us do our civic duty because recycling is the responsible thing to do in our society. Because of people like you, we can follow the advice of important leaders by recycling. You CAN join the fight!’

Extraneous changes too!

Kidwell et al, 2013 figure 4

Kidwell et al, 2013 figure 3

‘STUDY 2: SIMPLE SLOPES OF APPEAL TYPE BY POLITICAL IDEOLOGY ON WEEKLY RECYCLING’

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

4. ‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms.’

5. ‘exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’

Are there other cases where this argument works?

Can liberals’ attitudes also be changed using a similar ethical framing strategy?

\citet{day:2014_shiftinga}: no evidence that liberals become more conservative on typically conservative issues when these are framed in terms of harm or fairness (from STudy 1);
... but they do find shifts in conservative participants’ views on typically liberal issuse when these are framed in terms of purity [not shown]
They also find entrenching effects (libs become more typically liberal when typically liberal issues are framed in terms of harm or fairness (and likewise for conservatives))

‘the spare sentence-long, stimuli used in the studies’ (Feinberg & Willer, p. 1667)

\citet[p.~1667]{feinberg:2015_gulfa} comment on \citet{day:2014_shiftinga}: ‘It is possible that the inconsistency of the moral framing effects in these studies owed to the spare sentence-long, stimuli used in the studies.’

Day et al, 2014 figure 1A-B

Can liberals’ attitudes also be changed using a similar ethical framing strategy?

Feinberg & Willer, 2015 figure 6 (on Study 6)

Observation 1: The novel feature here is that the issue is a one that conservatives are generally more sensitive to, and changing the moral framing is shifting Liberal’s views. (I think this is important because it shows that the strategy for changing attitudes works for liberals as well as conservatives.)
Obs 2: the basic approach also works for issues other than climate change.
[Aside] Now see that they get essentially the same result when they group people not by their political views but directly by their fairness scores.
caption: ‘Figure 6. The interaction between political ideology and message framing (top panel) and between fairness morality and message framing (bottom panel) on support for making English the official language of the United States (Study 6).’
They computed two fairness scores. ‘we calculated each participant’s average score on the fairness scale and subtracted out the average of the four remaining moral domains. Doing so allowed us to capture each participant’s specific endorsement of the fairness foundation, while accounting for the tendency for some participants to report high levels of endorsement across all the foundations, labeling this mea- sure fairness score—continuous. Second, we used participants’ ranking of the fairness foundation, relative to the other foundations, labeling this measure fairness score—rank.’
The lower panel in this figure shows the interaction with fairness score—continuous

Can liberals’ attitudes also be changed using a similar ethical framing strategy?

Day et al, 2014 : no evidence of persuasion for liberals (but for conservatives)

Feinberg & Willer, 2015 : yes

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

4. ‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms.’

5. ‘exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’

Is there (any more) conflicting research?

 
\section{Moral Foundations Theory: Empirical Objections}
 
\section{Moral Foundations Theory: Empirical Objections}

Graham et al, 2009 figure 1

The Joan-Lars-Joseph objection

The evidence on cultural variation says socially conservative participants tend to regard all five foundations as roughly equally morally relevant.

This does not generate the prediction that socially conservative participants will be more likely to view climate issues as ethical issues when linked on one foundation (e.g. purity) than when linked to another foundation (e.g. harm).

Kugler et al, 2014 figure 2

‘subjective’ conceptions vs. ‘a more independent, objective perspective’
‘Fig. 2 Trimmed path model illustrating that right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation mediate the relationship between political orientation and moral intuitions. Path coefficients are standardized regression coefficients of the trimmed model. Broken lines indicate non-significant paths at p<.05’
SDO : social dominance orientation
RWA : right-wing authoritarianism
I mentioned this before, but I want to spend more time on it because it seems like a case where a little philosophical groundwork could be useful (you job, not mine ...

‘This article [distinguishes] between subjective conceptions of morality
(which are [...] indistinguishable from mere moralizing)
and
morality from a more independent, objective perspective’

My sense: recognising diversity in ethical systems does not, of course, imply approval of them.
Separate two things. First linking ‘subjective conceptions’ to ’mere moralizing’ appears to be a mistake. (You might want to argue that there is no cultural variation in ethics, but you wouldn’t do it like this.)
Put that aside to get to the real issue: Do we want a distinction between these? Is there any use for a distinction bewteen spurious moralizing from genuinely ethical commitments?
Example: someone campaigns against gay marriage. Is it religious conviction that drives them? They might say it is, but we wouldn’t necessarily take their word for it. Well, look at the book they’re basing their actions on. Are their attitudes consistent, or do they have different attitudes to sexuality and to other apparently forbidden thinks (like ursury)?
‘This article [distinguishes] between subjective conceptions of morality (which are, after all, indistinguishable from mere moralizing) and morality from a more independent, objective perspective [...] the moral valuation of ingroup loyalty, obedience to authority, and purity concerns is associated with attitudes and belief systems that may be considered prejudicial and therefore morally unsavory liberal-conservative differences in the endorsement of these three ‘binding’ intuitions may be attributable, at least in part, to the fact that conservatives tend to be higher than liberals on authoritarianism. Furthermore, liberal-conservative differences in the endorsement of fairness and avoidance of harm are attributable to the fact that liberals tend to be lower than conservatives on social dominance orientation [...] The fact that these two types of moral concerns have opposite effects on intergroup hostility and support for discrimination against foreigners and immigrants raises questions about the assumption that ‘binding’ and ‘individualizing’ (or perhaps ‘humanistic’ concerns) should be treated as operating on the same moral plane, objectively speaking’ \citep[p.~416]{kugler:2014_another}.

Graham et al, 2013 table 2.1

Note the claim that moral foundations arose in evolutionary history as solutions to specific challenges faced by humans’ ancestors.
There is no obvious contradiction between accepting this and also endorsing Kugler et al’s claims (if you can make sense of their claim to a ‘more independent, objective perspective’.)

Should we distinguish cultural variation from mere moralizing?

If so, how?

Is there even more conflicting research?

‘harm is central in moral cognition across moral diversity for both liberals and conservatives’

\citep[p.~1158]{schein:2015_unifying}.

We found evidence for ‘a common dyadic template than with a specific number of distinct moral mechanisms that are differentially expressed across liberals and conservatives’

\citep[p.~1158]{schein:2015_unifying}.

Schein & Gray, 2015 p. 1158

Is there yet more conflicting research?

Recall the basic requirements from earlier

Basic requirements

- internal validity (roughly, do answers to the three questions appear to reflect a single underlying tendency)

- Test–retest reliability (are you as an individual likely to give the same answers at widely-spaced intervals?)

- external validity (relation to other scales)

- measurement invariance [we’ll come to this later]

see \citep{lee:2018_testing} on measurement invariance

‘A finding of measurement invariance would provide more confidence that use of the MFQ across cultures can shed light on meaningful differences between cultures rather than merely reflecting the measurement properties of the MFQ’

\citep[p.~2]{iurino:2018_testing}

Iurino & Saucier, 2018 p. 2

I’m not mentioning Iurino & Saucier, 2018’s study because they note some limits of their sample and methodology.

Does Moral Foundations Theory provide a model that is invariant?

Davies et al, 2014 : metric invariance for gender groups

(scalar invariance not tested)

Davis et al, 2014 : metric but not scalar invariance for Black vs White people

\citep{davis:2016_moral} found metric but not scalar invariance

Dogruyol et al, 2019 : metric non-invariance for WEIRD/non-WEIRD samples

‘the five-factor model of MFQ revealed a good fit to the data on both WEIRD and non-WEIRD samples. Besides, the five-factor model yielded a better fit to the data as compared to the two-factor model of MFQ. Measurement invariance test across samples validated factor structure for the five-factor model, yet a comparison of samples provided metric non-invariance implying that item loadings are different across groups [...] although the same statements tap into the same moral foundations in each case, the strength of the link between the statements and the foundations were different in WEIRD and non-WEIRD cultures’ \citep{dogruyol:2019_fivefactor}.

‘across subscales, there were problems with scalar invariance, which suggests that researchers may need to carefully consider whether this scale is working similarly across groups before conducting mean comparisons’

\citep[p.~e27]{davis:2016_moral}

Davis et al, 2016 p. e27

Graham et al, 2009 figure 1

Are the differences in means measurement artefacts?

On balance, this seems likely.

There is a risk of building a theory on measurement artefacts.

‘entire literatures can develop on the basis of faulty measurement assumptions.’

\citep[p.~128]{davis:2017_purity}

Davis et al, 2017 p. 128

Stop.

On balance, MFT seems to be supported by a growing body of evidence.

Although limited, MFT is probably useful and there is no better alternative.

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

4. ‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms.’

5. ‘exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’

This is helpful. Supports 5.
But we can still question whether 5 really supports the idea that the effect is drive by ‘moral concerns’ [foundations].
What drives the effects?

Could we explain the observed effects on attitudes and actions
without appeal to cultural variation in moral concerns
(and so without invoking Moral Foundations Theory)?

Schuldt et al, 2017

‘A nationally representative survey of 1212 U.S. adults was fielded online by GfK (formerly KnowledgeNetworks) between April 15 and May 1, 2016, approximately 11 months after the release of the encyclical and 7 months after the pope’s U.S. visit.’

How much do you know about Pope Francis’ views on climate change? [inexact wording]

‘Do you consider climate change to be a moral or ethical issue?’

Results

‘Whereas a minority (46%) of respondents reported perceiving climate change as a moral issue in the control condition, this figure rose to 51% among those in the pope prime condition. Notably, this effect remained significant (B = .26, OR = 1.30, p = .03)’

‘the pope prime exerted a stronger effect on the moral beliefs of Republicans: 30% of Republicans in the control group reported perceiving climate change as a moral issue compared to 39% of Republicans in the pope prime condition, X2(469) = 4.32, p = .04. By comparison, Democrats were equally likely to report perceiving climate change as a moral or ethical issue regardless of condition (61% vs. 58% in the treatment versus control group, respectively), X2 (662) = .57, p=.45.’

‘the pope prime exerted a stronger effect on the moral beliefs of Republicans

‘Democrats were equally likely to report perceiving climate change as a moral or ethical issue regardless of condition’

fluency. Perhaps MFT is not the right explanation and the difference is some more superficial cultural variation?
‘the persuasiveness of a message is enhanced when it fits with the observer’s mental representational state (Schwarz and Clore 1983). When encountering information that is consistent with their beliefs, values, and opinions, individuals are likely to experience a feeling of fluency or ease of comprehension, generating a “feels right” experience (Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman 2004). Similar to positive affect (Cesario, Grant, and Higgins 2004), in which individuals feel a generalized state of emotional arousal, fluency additionally engenders a feeling that something “just fits” by feeling genuine and desirable (Lee and Aaker 2004). Moreover, Kim et al. (2009) suggest that this feeling “right” elicits more favorable evaluations of a message because individuals misattribute their feeling-right experience to the quality of the persuasive message’ \citep[p~.352]{kidwell:2013_getting}

Kidwell et al, 2013 figure 1

Fluency matters for

familiarity judgements

agency judgements

surprise judgements

...

fluency. Perhaps MFT is not the right explanation and the difference is some more superficial cultural variation?

Kidwell et al, 2013 figure 1

I was asking ...

Could we explain the observed effects on attitudes and actions
without appeal to cultural variation in moral concerns
(and so without invoking Moral Foundations Theory)?

To the extent we think fluency (and perhaps other cognitive factors) drive the effect, we might be agnostic about whether what lies behind fluency is a deep cultural difference or a relatively superficial divide in terms of how things are phrased in different groups.

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

4. ‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms.’

5. ‘exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’

End of this discussion. Time to wrap things up theoretically ...

What do discoveries concerning human moral psychology imply for the feasibility of democratically mitigating climate change?

Plan:

Work through Feinberg & Willer, 2013 ‘The Moral Roots of Environmental Attitudes’

 

Comparisons between Theories

 
\section{Comparisons between Theories}
 
\section{Comparisons between Theories}

[nativism] ‘There is a first draft of the moral mind’

[cultural learning] ‘The first draft of the moral mind gets edited during development within a culture’

[intuitionism] ‘Intuitions come first’ --- the Social Intuitionist Model is true

[pluralism] ‘There are many psychological foundations of morality’

\citep{graham:2019_moral}

Graham et al, 2019

Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008 figure 4.1

[nativism] ‘There is a first draft of the moral mind’

[cultural learning] ‘The first draft of the moral mind gets edited during development within a culture’

[intuitionism] ‘Intuitions come first’ --- the Social Intuitionist Model is true

[pluralism] ‘There are many psychological foundations of morality’

\citep{graham:2019_moral}

Graham et al, 2019

[nativism] ‘There is a first draft of the moral mind’

[cultural learning] ‘The first draft of the moral mind gets edited during development within a culture’

[intuitionism] ‘Intuitions come first’ --- the Social Intuitionist Model is true

[pluralism] ‘There are many psychological foundations of morality’

\citep{graham:2019_moral}

Graham et al, 2019

Affect Heuristic

Q: What do adult humans compute that enables their moral intuitions to track moral attributes (such as wrongness)?

Hypothesis:

They rely on the ‘affect heuristic’: ‘if thinking about an act [...] makes you feel bad [...], then judge that it is morally wrong’.

Cushman et al, 2010

Are these consistent theories?

[nativism] ‘There is a first draft of the moral mind’

[cultural learning] ‘The first draft of the moral mind gets edited during development within a culture’

[intuitionism] ‘Intuitions come first’ --- the Social Intuitionist Model is true

[pluralism] ‘There are many psychological foundations of morality’

\citep{graham:2019_moral}

Graham et al, 2019

Linguistic Analogy

‘the mind contains a moral grammar: a complex and possibly domain-specific set of rules [...] this system enables individuals to determine the deontic status of an infinite variety of acts and omissions’

Mikhail, 2007 p. 144

Are these consistent theories?
first incompatibility -- intuitions not supposed to be affective according to LA (but they are according to MFT)
second incompatibility -- LA is monistic (MFT is pluralist)

[nativism] ‘There is a first draft of the moral mind’

[cultural learning] ‘The first draft of the moral mind gets edited during development within a culture’

[intuitionism] ‘Intuitions come first’ --- the Social Intuitionist Model is true

[pluralism] ‘There are many psychological foundations of morality’

\citep{graham:2019_moral}

Graham et al, 2019

Dual Process Theory

Two (or more) ethical processes are distinct:
the conditions which influence whether they occur,
and which outputs they generate,
do not completely overlap.

‘[...] moral judgment is the product of both intuitive and rational psychological processes, and it is the product of [...] ‘affective’ and ‘cognitivemechanisms’

\citep[p.~48]{cushman:2010_multi}.

Cushman et al, 2010 p. 48

Are these consistent theories?
You can see the theories making friends here: moral foundations might give us an account of the fast processes (one that doesn’t fit entirely with Greene’s ideas about consequentialism vs deontology, perhaps).

Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008 figure 4.1

Key issue: are unrelfective judgements essentially the result of the foundations? Dual process theory maybe explains why MFQ goes wrong?

What does the Moral Foundations Questionnaire measure?

Social Intuitionist Model

Unreflective ethical judgements are primarily consequences of moral foundations.

Dual-Process Theory

Unreflective ethical judgements are consequences of both moral foundations and processes which involve reasoning from known principles.

conclusion

In conclusion, ...

What do discoveries concerning human moral psychology imply for the feasibility of democratically mitigating climate change?

1. ‘Moral convictions and the emotions they evoke shape political attitudes’

2. There are at least two fundamental domains of human morality, including harm and purity.

3. ‘liberals and conservatives possess different moral profiles’

4. ‘liberals express greater levels of environmental concern than do conservatives in part because liberals are more likely to view environmental issues in moral terms.’

5. ‘exposing conservatives to proenvironmental appeals based on moral concerns that uniquely resonate with them will lead them to view the environment in moral terms and be more supportive of proenvironmental efforts.’

Well supported
Also well supported, and supported independently of Moral Foundations Theory
I think lack of scalar invariance is a big problem here!

My personal conclusion

Discovery

Ethical reframing can be effective in motivating action on climate change.

Problem

The standard explanation for why this is,
invoking Moral Foundations Theory,
is not currently well supported by evidence (contra Graham, Haidt et al).