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‘Does emotion influence moral judgment or merely motivate morally relevant action?’
Huebner et al, 2009
Huebner et al, 2009 figure 1 (part)
Huebner et al, 2009 figure 1 (part)
Huebner et al, 2009 figure 1
‘these data fail to isolate the precise point at which emotion has a role in our moral psychology. ...
emotional stimuli ... presented before the scenario is read could
... influence the interpretation of the scenario
or the question.
Or, emotion could act as a gain on what has already been conceived as a moral infraction (thereby, increasing the severity of the perceived wrong)’
Huebner et al, 2009 figure 1 (part)
Disgust influences unreflective ethical judgement regardless of what you think you are disgusted by.
vs
Disgust associated with specific actions influences unreflective ethical judgements about those actions.
Causing disgust by dipping subjects’ hands in goo doesn’t work.
‘In retrospect, it seems likely that any disgust elicited by the moral dilemmas was likely to be attributed to the feeling of the gooey substance rather than the other way around.’
‘affective influences on judgment can often be eliminated by making salient an irrelevant but plausible cause for the feelings.’
That is, subject’s disgust has to associated with the events described. (Compare aversion following poisoning.)
Schnall et al, 2008 p. 1106
Causing disgust by dipping subjects’ hands in goo doesn’t work.
‘In retrospect, it seems likely that any disgust elicited by the moral dilemmas was likely to be attributed to the feeling of the gooey substance rather than the other way around.’
‘affective influences on judgment can often be eliminated by making salient an irrelevant but plausible cause for the feelings.’
That is, subject’s disgust has to associated with the events described. (Compare aversion following poisoning.)
Huebner et al, 2009 figure 1 (part)
Disgust influences unreflective ethical judgement regardless of what you think you are disgusted by.
vs
Disgust associated with specific actions influences unreflective ethical judgements about those actions.
Huebner et al, 2009 figure 1
‘these data fail to isolate the precise point at which emotion has a role in our moral psychology. ...
Does emotion influence moral judgment or merely motivate morally relevant action?
Yes! --- Sinnott-Armstrong et al, 2010
No! --- Dwyer, 2009; Mikhail, 2007