

Lecture 01 : Moral Psychology

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1. Introduction

Humans have ethical abilities—abilities to act in accordance with ethical considerations, to make ethical judgements, to exercise moral suasion, and to feel things in response to unethical or superordinate acts. Moral psychology is the study of the psychological aspects of these ethical abilities. The questions for this course are: What ethical abilities do humans have? What states and processes underpin them? What, if anything, do discoveries about ethical abilities imply for political conflict, and what do they imply about ethics?

Moral psychology is the study of psychological aspects of ethical abilities (Doris et al. 2017).¹

The Overall Questions for this course are:

- What ethical abilities do humans have? What states and processes underpin them?
- What, if anything, do discoveries about ethical abilities imply for political conflict, and what do they imply about ethics?

2. Why Investigate Moral Psychology?

We consider three reasons (and one non-reason) for studying investigating moral psychology. This is not supposed to be an exhaustive list.

Why study moral psychology? It matters for understanding human sociality, for understanding—and perhaps overcoming—political conflict, and perhaps also for understanding whether claims to ethical knowledge are justified.

2.1. Moral Psychology Matters for Understanding Human Sociality

Humans are unusual among apes in cooperating with non-kin. They appear to have been doing this since well before the advent of farming.²

¹ Note that the term ‘moral psychology’ is sometimes used for a more narrowly philosophical project about what motivates moral actions and ‘what kind of beings we are or ought to be, morally speaking’ (Superson 2014). That is not the topic of this module.

² Hill et al. (2011, p. 1289) argue that ‘our foraging ancestors evolved a novel social structure that emphasized [...] co-residence with many unrelated individuals.’ This conclusion is based on their observation that, across 32 contemporary hunter-gatherer societies, ‘bands are mainly composed of individuals either distantly related by kinship and/or marriage or unrelated altogether. [...] primary kin generally make up less than 10% of a residential band’ (Hill et al. 2011, p. 1288). See further Apicella et al. (2012).

How is this possible given evolutionary pressures to favour kin? Attempts to explain this by appeal to kin selection or reciprocity do not appear promising. Instead it may be that

‘Humans are [...] adapted [...] to live in morally structured communities’ thanks in part to ‘the capacity to operate systems of moralistic punishment’ and susceptibility ‘to moral suasion’ (Richerson & Boyd 1999, p. 257).

Further, ‘humans (both individually and as a species) develop morality because it is required for cooperative systems to flourish’ (Hamlin 2015, p. 108)

2.1.1. Moral Foundations?

Haidt & Joseph (2004) and Haidt & Graham (2007) claim that there are five evolutionarily ancient, psychologically basic abilities linked to:

1. harm/care
2. fairness (including reciprocity)
3. in-group loyalty
4. respect for authority
5. purity, sanctity

2.2. Moral Psychology Matters for Understanding Political Conflict

‘The moral framing of climate change has typically focused on only the first two values: harm to present and future generations and the unfairness of the distribution of burdens caused by climate change. As a result, the justification for action on climate change holds less moral priority for conservatives than liberals’ (Markowitz & Shariff 2012, p. 244).

2.3. Will Moral Psychology Change How Philosophers Do Ethics?

Kant famously claimed that Kant (1870) Several claims in the literature imply that it will:

Humans lack direct insight into moral properties (Sinnott-Armstrong et al. 2010).

Intuitions cannot be used to argue against theories (Sinnott-Armstrong et al. 2010).

Intuitions are unreliable in unfamiliar* situations (Greene 2014, p. 715).

Philosophers, including Kant, do not use reason to figure out what is right or wrong, but 'primarily to justify and organize their preexisting intuitive conclusions' (Greene 2014, p. 718).

A key issue on this course is whether discoveries about moral psychology justify any such claims.

3. Practical Things

4. Moral Intuitions

A person's *intuitions* are the claims they take to be true independently of whether those claims are justified inferentially. And a person's *moral intuitions* are those of their intuitions that concern ethical matters. Moral intuitions matter philosophically because they are widely held to be necessary, one way or another, for ethical knowledge. They also matter scientifically insofar as they underpin abilities to produce fast ethical responses.

4.1. What are moral intuitions?

On this course, a person's *intuitions* are the claims they take to be true independently of whether those claims are justified inferentially. And a person's *moral intuitions* are simply those of their intuitions that concern ethical matters.

Not everyone adopts this terminological stipulation. According to Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2010, p. 256): 'When we refer to *moral intuitions*, we mean strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs.' For many purposes such differences are not critical. But note that philosophers sometimes use the term 'intuition' in ways that differ drastically. To illustrate, Bedke (2008) offers two ways of characterising what philosophers call intuitions:

'intuitions are understandings of self-evident propositions, where such understanding alone is sufficient for justification' and 'intuitions are sui generis seeming states [...] which are like [...] seemings based on sensory experience [...] in the way they justify' (Bedke 2008, p. 253).³

³ As you would expect, other philosophers offer terminological stipulations about intuitions which are incompatible with Bedke's. See, for instance, Audi (2015, p. 65): 'some intuitions have non-self-evident propositions as objects, for example, my intuition that I should protect the wandering toddler even with its apparent mother in view.'

Neither of these is a moral intuition for the purposes of this course. (One could coherently maintain that moral intuitions exist in our sense while denying that there are any intuitions in Bedke's sense.)

As well as moral intuitions, humans have linguistic intuitions and mathematical intuitions. Mathematical intuitions appear to be underpinned by relatively automatic processes which are independent of other mathematical abilities and may also be domain specific. It is possible that the same is true of moral intuitions. But note that we have not assumed this in our characterisation of them (this is a matter for discovery, not stipulation).

4.2. Why Are Moral Intuitions of Interest?

There are both philosophical and scientific reasons for interest in moral intuitions.

Philosophically, intuitions are key to a view in ethics called 'Intuitionism' whose key tenet is that 'moral intuitions [are] basic sources of evidence' (Stratton-Lake 2020, footnote 1). Although a minority view, moral intuitionism has recently gained some interesting proponents (Audi 2015, for example).

Of wider interest, intuitions in philosophy are also essential for reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1999). Many ethicists regard 'the method of reflective equilibrium, or a process very similar to it, is the best or most fruitful method of moral inquiry [and] the one that seems most likely to lead to justified moral beliefs' (McMahan 2013, p. 111). Later in this course we will consider whether discoveries in moral psychology about intuitions are a good source of objections to the method of reflective equilibrium. This would be a major challenge to much contemporary ethics.

Scientifically, moral intuitions are interesting because of a fundamental feature of all cognition and action, namely speed-accuracy trade-offs. In general, the faster you must respond (or the less energy you can devote to responding), the less accurate you are likely to be (Heitz 2014).⁴ Since humans, like all animals, often stand to gain more from responding faster, and since they have historically had limited resources of energy, it is often advantageous for them to trade away accuracy in order to gain speed. Moral intuitions are important because they enable faster responses.

⁴ To illustrate, suppose you were required to judge which of two only very slightly different lines was longer. All other things being equal, making a faster judgement would involve being less accurate, and being more accurate would require making a slower judgement. (This idea is due to Henmon (1911), who has been influential although he didn't actually get to manipulate speed experimentally because of 'a change of work' (p.~195); see Link & Tindall (1971) for evidence.)

4.3. Our Question

In the first part of the course, we will focus on a single question:

How, if at all, do emotions influence moral intuitions?

5. Moral Intuitions and an Affect Heuristic

How, if at all, do emotions and feelings influence moral intuitions? And what do adult humans compute that enables their moral intuitions to track moral attributes (such as wrongness)?

Our long term aim is to answer this question: [Question 1] Do emotions influence moral intuitions?

5.1. Question 2

What do adult humans *compute* that enables their moral intuitions to *track* moral attributes (such as wrongness)?

To illustrate the distinction between tracking and computing: a motion detector tracks the presence of people by computing patterns of infrared energy.

5.2. The Affect Heuristic

The Affect Heuristic offers an answer to Questions 1 and 2.

The *Affect Heuristic*: ‘if thinking about an act [...] makes you feel bad [...], then judge that it is morally wrong’ (Sinnott-Armstrong et al. 2010).

Why is this an answer to Question 2? Because it says that humans *compute* how an act makes them feel in order to *track* whether it is morally wrong.

Compare: humans track the toxicity of potential foods by computing how smelling or tasting the potential food makes them feel.

What about Question 1? If the Affect Heuristic is a true answer to Question 2, then the answer to Question 1 is yes, emotions do influence moral intuitions. For it is by computing emotions that our moral intuitions track moral attributes. (This assumes that feeling bad is an emotion, of course.)

Note that we have not yet considered whether the hypothesis about the Affect Heuristic is true.

6. Moral Intuitions and Emotions: Evidence

What evidence might support Sinnott-Armstrong et al (2010)'s view that unreflective ethical judgements are the product of an affect heuristic?

Question: What do adult humans compute that enables their moral intuitions to track moral attributes (such as wrongness)?

Hypothesis: They rely on the Affect Heuristic.

How can we tell whether the Hypothesis is correct? By testing its predictions ...

Prediction generated by the Hypothesis: if you make people feel bad without them realising it, they will be more inclined to judge that something is morally wrong.

Evidence that the Prediction is correct:

‘For high-PBC [Private Body Consciousness] (but not low-PBC) people, our disgust manipulations increased the severity of moral condemnation relative to the neutral conditions’ (Schnall et al. 2008, p. 1105)

(Schnall et al. 2008, p. 1106) summarise their discoveries in this way:

‘rather than being obligatory, affective influences on judgment can often be eliminated by making salient an irrelevant but plausible cause for the feelings. We unwittingly evoked this process in an earlier and failed attempt to carry out these experiments. As a disgust manipulation, we asked participants to immerse one hand in a gooey substance [...]. Immediately afterward, participants made morality ratings. This very concrete disgust experience, [...] did not influence moral judgments [...], presumably because the unusual nature of the experience and its obvious relation to disgust remained highly salient as participants made their moral judgments. In retrospect, it seems likely that any disgust elicited by the moral dilemmas was likely to be attributed to the feeling of the gooey substance rather than the other way around.’

We should be cautious in putting too much weight on a single study, of course. Ideally we will have a range of studies, using different paradigms, from different labs. We should also consider evidence which does, or appears to, conflict with the Hypothesis. (It's common for a hypothesis to generate one prediction which is confirmed, leading us to provisionally accept it, only to discover, perhaps much later, another prediction which is falsified.)

Provisionally, we may draw four conclusions: > 1. ‘the effect of disgust applies regardless of whether the action to be judged is itself disgusting. > 1. disgust influenced moral, > but not additional nonmoral, judgments. > 1. because the effect occurred most strongly for people who were sensitive to their own bodily cues, > the results appear to concern feelings of disgust rather than merely the primed concept of disgust. > 1. induced sadness did not have similar effects’ > (Schnall et al. 2008, pp. 1105–6).

6.1. Appendix: Some details

You probably don’t need to read this, but you may be curious. And I’m usually going to expect you to get the details from the paper yourself, but as it’s early in the course ...

6.2. Details from Experiment 1

‘The sadness clip (from *The Champ*) portrayed the death of a boy’s mentor, the disgust clip (from *Trainspotting*) portrayed a man using an unsanitary toilet and the neutral clip (from a National Geographic special) portrayed fish at the Great Barrier Reef’ (Lerner et al. 2004).

‘Three of these vignettes involved a moral violation with disgust—Dog (a man who ate his dead dog), Plane Crash (starving survivors of a plane crash consider cannibalism), and Kitten (a man deriving sexual pleasure from playing with a kitten)—and three of the vignettes involved a moral violation with no disgust—Wallet (finding a wallet and not returning it to its owner), Resume (a person falsifying his resume), and Trolley (preventing the death of five men by killing one man). The instructions told participants to go with their initial intuitions when responding’ (Schnall et al. 2008, p. 1100)

6.3. Vignettes from Schnall et al (2008) Experiment 4

Dog Frank’s dog was killed by a car in front of his house. Frank had heard that in China people occasionally eat dog meat, and he was curious what it tasted like. So he cut up the body and cooked it and ate it for dinner. How wrong is it for Frank to eat his dead dog for dinner?

Plane Crash Your plane has crashed in the Himalayas. The only survivors are yourself, another man, and a young boy. The three of you travel for days, battling extreme cold and wind. Your only chance at survival is to find your way to a small village on the other side of the mountain, several days away. The boy has a broken leg and cannot move very quickly. His chances of surviving the journey are essentially zero. Without food, you and the other man will probably die as well. The other man suggests that you sacrifice the

boy and eat his remains over the next few days. How wrong is it to kill this boy so that you and the other man may survive your journey to safety?

Wallet You are walking down the street when you come across a wallet lying on the ground. You open the wallet and find that it contains several hundred dollars in cash as well the owner's driver's license. From the credit cards and other items in the wallet it's very clear that the wallet's owner is wealthy. You, on the other hand, have been hit by hard times recently and could really use some extra money. You consider sending the wallet back to the owner without the cash, keeping the cash for yourself. How wrong is it for you to keep the money you found in the wallet in order to have more money for yourself?

Resume You have a friend who has been trying to find a job lately without much success. He figured that he would be more likely to get hired if he had a more impressive resume. He decided to put some false information on his resume in order to make it more impressive. By doing this he ultimately managed to get hired, beating out several candidates who were actually more qualified than he. How wrong was it for your friend to put false information on his resume in order to help him find employment?

Kitten Matthew is playing with his new kitten late one night. He is wearing only his boxer shorts, and the kitten sometimes walks over his genitals. Eventually, this arouses him, and he begins to rub his bare genitals along the kitten's body. The kitten purrs, and seems to enjoy the contact. How wrong is it for Matthew to be rubbing himself against the kitten?

Trolley You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway workmen. On the tracks extending to the right is a single railway workman. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of the five workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit a switch on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman. How wrong is it for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the five workmen?

7. Conclusion

We have seen some evidence for the view that emotions influence moral intuitions; but, by itself, that evidence is far from sufficient to draw a conclusion. More research is needed.

8. Question Session 01

There are no question sessions this year, but some of the notes from previous years are still relevant. These are included here.

8.1. Disgust: Nikki's Question

'Disgust is thought to have originated in distaste, a food-rejection impulse or motivation triggered by the ingestion of unpleasant-tasting substances, prototypically those that are bitter (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Because many bitter substances are toxic (Garcia, Hankins, Denton, & Coghlan, 1975), the role of distaste in food rejection has a clear and concrete adaptive function. Distaste appears to have very ancient origins: Even sea anemones, which first evolved some 500 million years ago, will expel bitter foods from their gastric cavity (Garcia et al., 1975)' (Chapman & Anderson 2013, p. 300).

Chapman et al. (2009, p. 1222) provide an important clue on how to think about disgust when they refer to 'the primitive motivational system of disgust'. My proposal would be that we treat disgust as a primary motivational state.

For a basic introduction to primary ('primitive') motivational states, see:

- https://mind-and-reality.butterfill.com/lecture_18_stream.html#action/motivational_states

Glossary

Affect Heuristic In the context of moral psychology, the Affect Heuristic is this principle: 'if thinking about an act [...] makes you feel bad [...], then judge that it is morally wrong' (Sinnott-Armstrong et al. 2010). These authors hypothesise that the Affect Heuristic explains moral intuitions.

A different (but related) Affect Heuristic has also be postulated to explain how people make judgements about risky things are: The more dread you feel when imagining an event, the more risky you should judge it is (see Pachur et al. 2012. 6, 7

heuristic A *heuristic* links an inaccessible attribute to an accessible attribute

such that, within a limited but useful range of situations, someone could track the inaccessible attribute by computing the accessible attribute. 6

inaccessible An attribute is *inaccessible* in a context just if it is difficult or impossible, in that context, to discern substantive truths about that attribute. For example, in ordinary life and for most people the attribute *being further from Kilmerly (in Wales) than Steve's brother Matt is* would be inaccessible.

See Kahneman & Frederick (2005, p. 271): 'We adopt the term accessibility to refer to the ease (or effort) with which particular mental contents come to mind.' 10

moral intuition According to this lecturer, a person's intuitions are the claims they take to be true independently of whether those claims are justified inferentially. And a person's *moral* intuitions are simply those of their intuitions that concern ethical matters.

According to Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2010, p. 256), moral intuitions are 'strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs.'

Audi (2015) distinguishes various notions of intuition including episodic intuitions. These 'episodic intuitions' are supposed to be analogous to perceivings: they are 'intellectual seemings ... of the truth of a proposition.' 5, 7

moral psychology The study of ethical abilities. These include abilities to act in accordance with ethical considerations, to make ethical judgments, to exercise moral suasion, and to feel things in response to unethical or superordinate acts. 4

track For a process to *track* an attribute is for the presence or absence of the attribute to make a difference to how the process unfolds, where this is not an accident. (And for a system or device to track an attribute is for some process in that system or device to track it.)

Tracking an attribute is contrasted with *computing* it. Unlike tracking, computing typically requires that the attribute be represented. (The distinction between tracking and computing is a topic of 5.) 6, 7

unfamiliar problem An unfamiliar problem (or situation) is one 'with which we have inadequate evolutionary, cultural, or personal experience' (Greene 2014, p. 714). 4

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