

# Short Essay Questions : Moral Psychology

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### 0.1. Instructions

Choose any one question. Do not attempt to answer more than one question in your essay.

### 0.2. Using sources

Do not cite sources that are not referenced in the lecture notes already. Unless you have an excellent reason for doing so, which you must state in the essay.

Always give page numbers.

Examiners on this course frequently comment 'your essay could have been improved by focussing on fewer high-quality sources and covering them in more depth.'

### 0.3. Lecture Materials

Each question draws on specific sections of the lecture material, which also provide sources. Your essay should demonstrate knowledge of evidence, arguments and theories from the lecture material relevant to the thesis you aim to establish.

Examiners on this course frequently comment 'your essay could have been improved by making better use of the lecture material.'

### 0.4. Glossary

Use the glossary.

The lecture materials include a glossary to facilitate communication between us. You may deviate from the glossary providing you explicate your terms and providing you have good reason for doing so.

### 0.5. Advice

The questions below are written with a view to allowing a wide range of good answers, including some your examiners may not have foreseen. Your essay should answer the question chosen but it need not provide a complete answer. The best essays are often tightly focussed on one aspect of the question. This is fine: just be sure to explain the part of the question you are addressing and demonstrate that you are aware of what else would be needed to fully answer the question.

## 0.6. Structure

Open your essay by stating the thesis you will defend.

If necessary (ideally not), explain how the thesis is relevant to your chosen question.

The rest of your essay should provide a single coherent line of argument for your thesis. And nothing else.

## 0.7. Difficulty Level

Some questions permit answers that are relatively straightforward to establish. In general, you should not limit yourself to establishing a straightforward answer if aiming for a high mark.

## 0.8. Support for Planning

One of the seminars for this course will provide you with an opportunity to discuss your plans.

## 0.9. Marking Criteria

This course uses the standard philosophy marking criteria. Ideally your essay will demonstrate an awareness of a philosophical issue in moral psychology. We are aware that students taking this course may come from a variety of disciplines. Your essay can be written in the style of an essay from any of the disciplines covered on this course.

## 0.10. Citation Style

Use exactly one of the following citation styles: APA, Harvard or Chicago.

## 0.11. Word Count

Everything counts towards the word limit.

Acronyms, abbreviations and contractions count as the corresponding number of full words. For example, TLA counts as three words. (Hint: do not invent acronyms. Your readers are miserable enough already.)

There are many ways to count words. Your essay must be under the word limit according to any way of counting words. Your examiners' ways of counting words may not match your own, so leave a margin.

Examiners will stop reading if they hit the word limit.

### 0.12. Bespoke Questions

You may devise your own question through discussion with [s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk](mailto:s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk). Your question must then be submitted using a form on the Philosophy web pages and formally approved.

Do not answer a question not on this list without written approval.

# 1. How, if at all, do feelings or emotions influence ethical judgements?

## 1.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

## 1.2. Hints

Your answer may (and probably should) focus on a single feeling or emotion such as disgust.

Check the glossary entries on ethical judgement, intuition, and ethical intuition.

Follow the general instructions for *Short Essay Questions*.

## 1.3. Lecture Notes

*This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.*

The following lectures contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 01*
- *Lecture 02*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Does emotion influence moral judgment or merely motivate morally relevant action? (Reprise)* in Lecture 09
- *Moral Intuitions and Emotions: Evidence* in Lecture 01
- *Moral Intuitions and Emotions: Evaluating the Evidence* in Lecture 02
- *Moral Intuitions and an Affect Heuristic* in Lecture 01

## 1.4. Reading

*If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).*

- Tracy et al. (2019)

- Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2010)

### 1.5. Further Reading

- Chapman & Anderson (2013)
- Landy & Goodwin (2015)
- Salvo et al. (2025)
- Yang et al. (2013)
- Nichols (2002)
- Piazza et al. (2018)
- Schnall et al. (2008)

### 1.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

## 2. What is a heuristic? What role, if any, do heuristics play in explaining ethical judgements?

### 2.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

### 2.2. Hints

You almost certainly want to focus on the Affect Heuristic.

You are likely to want to focus specifically on ethical intuitions (as these are probably the only kind of ethical judgements where heuristics play a distinctive role).

Also check the glossary entries on inaccessible, heuristic, intuition, and track.

Follow the general instructions for *Short Essay Questions*.

### 2.3. Lecture Notes

*This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Why Is the Affect Heuristic Significant?* in Lecture 02
- *Does emotion influence moral judgment or merely motivate morally relevant action? (Reprise)* in Lecture 09
- *Moral Intuitions* in Lecture 01
- *Moral Intuitions and Emotions: Evaluating the Evidence* in Lecture 02
- *Moral Intuitions and an Affect Heuristic* in Lecture 01

### 2.4. Reading

*If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).*

- Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2010)

- Pachur et al. (2012)

## 2.5. Further Reading

- Kahneman & Frederick (2005)

## 2.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

### 3. On moral dumbfounding and moral disengagement

EITHER:

What challenge, if any, to theories of ethical judgement is posed by the possibility of moral dumbfounding?

OR:

What challenge, if any, to theories of ethical judgement is posed by the possibility of moral disengagement?

OR (most ambitious?):

What challenge, if any, to theories of ethical judgement is posed by the twin possibilities of moral dumbfounding and moral disengagement?

#### 3.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

#### 3.2. Hints

State which of the three questions (above) you are answering. (Do not write an essay titled 'On moral dumbfounding and moral disengagement'! That is not a question.)

Whichever question you attempt, be sure to answer with respect to a single theory of ethical judgement. Although several such theories were cited in the lecture notes linked below, the theory you most likely want to consider is Haidt & Bjorklund (2008)'s.

Check the glossary entries on theory of ethical judgements, moral dumbfounding and moral dumbfounding.

Follow the general instructions for *Short Essay Questions*.

#### 3.3. Lecture Notes

*This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.*

The following lecture contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 03*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Conclusion: Yet Another Puzzle* in Lecture 03
- *Moral Disengagement: The Evidence* in Lecture 03
- *Moral Disengagement: Significance* in Lecture 03
- *Moral Disengagement: The Theory* in Lecture 03
- *Why Is Moral Dumbfounding Significant?* in Lecture 03
- *Moral Dumbfounding* in Lecture 03
- *Reason and Atrocity: Hindriks' Observation* in Lecture 03

### 3.4. Reading

*If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).*

- Haidt et al. (2000)
- Bandura (2002)
- Haidt & Bjorklund (2008)

### 3.5. Further Reading

- Hindriks (2014)
- Bandura et al. (1996)
- McAlister et al. (2006)
- Osofsky et al. (2005)
- Royzman et al. (2015)
- McHugh et al. (2017)

### 3.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

## 4. Are there cultural differences in moral psychology?

### 4.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

### 4.2. Hints

Your answer may (and probably should) focus on discoveries from Moral Foundations Theory.

Check the glossary entries on moral pluralism, foundation, binding foundations, and individual foundations.

Follow the general instructions for *Short Essay Questions*.

### 4.3. Lecture Notes

*This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.*

The following lectures contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 04*
- *Lecture 05*

The following section contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Moral Foundations Theory Reprise* in Lecture 09

### 4.4. Reading

*If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).*

- Graham et al. (2013)
- Atari et al. (2023)

### 4.5. Further Reading

- Chakroff et al. (2013)
- Haidt & Bjorklund (2008)

- Kivikangas et al. (2021)

#### 4.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

## 5. What is moral reframing? Why, if at all, it is sometimes effective in modifying people's behaviour?

### 5.1. Am I Ready for This Question?

Take a quiz to check whether you are ready to answer this question.

### 5.2. Hints

Be sure you understand what moral reframing is. To answer this question you need to know at least two hypotheses about why moral reframing is effective and to understand which evidence supports each hypothesis (see *The Puzzle of Moral Foundations Theory* in Lecture 05).

Your answer may (and probably should) focus on discoveries from Moral Foundations Theory.

Follow the general instructions for *Short Essay Questions*.

### 5.3. Lecture Notes

*This is not an exhaustive list but may help you if you missed something. The list may grow over the weeks as lectures are added. Consider also using the search function.*

The following lecture contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Lecture 05*

The following sections contain material relevant to answering this question.

- *Framing Changes Ethical Attitudes* in Lecture 05
- *The Puzzle of Moral Foundations Theory* in Lecture 05
- *Moral Reframing and Process Dissociation* in Lecture 09

### 5.4. Reading

*If you are following the lecture notes and seminars, you should already know what to read. You do not need to consult this list. This is only for people coming to the assignment without using the lecture notes (not recommended).*

- Feinberg & Willer (2019)
- Wolsko et al. (2016)

- Feinberg & Willer (2015)

### 5.5. Further Reading

- Graham et al. (2009)
- Hurst & Stern (2020)
- Wolsko (2017)

### 5.6. Where to Find the Reading?

In some cases the references section already includes a link to help you find the reading. (These links will not appear in this pdf.)

If there is no link in the references section, start by searching for the title (and, if that fails, by title and authors) on google scholar. If this fails, the library has resources. If those fail, please check first with others on the course. If you still have problems, you may email your seminar tutor.

## Glossary

**Affect Heuristic** In the context of moral psychology, the Affect Heuristic is this principle: ‘if thinking about an act [...] makes you feel bad [...], then judge that it is morally wrong’ (Sinnott-Armstrong et al. 2010). These authors hypothesise that the Affect Heuristic explains moral intuitions.

A different (but related) Affect Heuristic has also been postulated to explain how people make judgements about risky things are: The more dread you feel when imagining an event, the more risky you should judge it is (see Pachur et al. 2012). 7

**binding foundations** Categories of moral concern linked to social needs; these are often taken to be betrayal/loyalty, subversion/authority, and impurity/purity (Graham et al. 2011). 11

**ethical intuition** See moral intuition. 5, 7

**ethical judgement** For a claim to be among a person’s judgements is for them to take it to be true. An ethical judgement is just a judgement involving something ethical. (Same as moral judgement.) 5, 7, 16, 17

**foundation** I am unsure what exactly a moral foundation is; my rough working assumption is that a foundation is an area of concern. The proponents of Moral Foundations Theory are clear on what makes something a moral foundation? It is ‘(a) being common in third-party normative judgments, (b) automatic affective evaluations, (c) cultural ubiquity though not necessarily universality, (d) evidence of innate preparedness, and (e) a robust preexisting evolutionary model’ (Atari et al. 2023, p. 1158). 11

**heuristic** A *heuristic* links an inaccessible attribute to an accessible attribute such that, within a limited but useful range of situations, someone could track the inaccessible attribute by computing the accessible attribute. 7

**inaccessible** An attribute is *inaccessible* in a context just if it is difficult or impossible, in that context, to discern substantive truths about that attribute. For example, in ordinary life and for most people the attribute *being further from Kilmery (in Wales) than Steve’s brother Matt is* would be inaccessible.

See Kahneman & Frederick (2005, p. 271): ‘We adopt the term accessibility to refer to the ease (or effort) with which particular mental contents come to mind.’ 7, 15

**individual foundations** Categories of moral concern linked to individual needs; these are often taken to be harm/care, cheating/fairness (Graham et al. 2011). Sometimes called *individualizing foundations*. 11

**intuition** According to this lecturer, a person’s intuitions are the claims they take to be true independently of whether those claims are justified inferentially. (Other sources may define this term differently.) 5, 7

**moral dumbfounding** ‘the stubborn and puzzled maintenance of an [ethical] judgment without supporting reasons’ (Haidt et al. 2000, p. 1). As McHugh et al. (2017, p. ) note, subsequent researchers have given different definitions of moral dumbfounding so that ‘there is [currently] no single, agreed definition of moral dumbfounding.’ I adopt the original authors’ definition. 9

**Moral Foundations Theory** The theory that moral pluralism is true; moral foundations are innate but also subject to cultural learning, and the Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement is correct (Graham et al. 2019). Proponents often claim, further, that cultural variation in how these innate foundations are woven into ethical abilities can be measured using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2011). Some empirical objections have been offered (Davis et al. 2016; Davis et al. 2017; Doğruyol et al. 2019). See ???. 11, 13, 15

**moral intuition** According to this lecturer, a person’s intuitions are the claims they take to be true independently of whether those claims are justified inferentially. And a person’s *moral* intuitions are simply those of their intuitions that concern ethical matters.

According to Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2010, p. 256), moral intuitions are ‘strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs.’

Audi (2015) distinguishes various notions of intuition including episodic intuitions. These ‘episodic intuitions’ are supposed to be analogous to perceivings: they are ‘intellectual seemings ... of the truth of a proposition.’ 15

**moral judgement** For a claim to be among a person’s judgements is for them to take it to be true. A moral judgement is just a judgement involving something moral. (Same as ethical judgement.) 15

**moral pluralism** Descriptive moral pluralism is the view that humans' ethical abilities involve distinct moral concerns (such as harm, equality and purity) which are not reducible to just one moral concern. 11

**moral reframing** 'A technique in which a position an individual would not normally support is framed in a way that it is consistent with that individual's moral values. [...] In the political arena, moral reframing involves arguing in favor of a political position that members of a political group would not normally support in terms of moral concerns that the members strongly ascribe to' (Feinberg & Willer 2019, pp. 2–3). 13

**Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgement** A model on which intuitive processes are directly responsible for moral judgements (Haidt & Bjorklund 2008). One's own reasoning does not typically affect one's own moral judgements, but (outside philosophy, perhaps) is typically used only to provide post-hoc justification after moral judgements are made. Reasoning does affect others' moral intuitions, and so provides a mechanism for cultural learning. 16

**theory of ethical judgement** A psychological theory which explains how people arrive at ethical judgements. For example, Haidt & Bjorklund (2008, p. 189)'s *Social Intuitionist Model* is a theory of ethical judgement. 9

**track** For a process to *track* an attribute is for the presence or absence of the attribute to make a difference to how the process unfolds, where this is not an accident. (And for a system or device to track an attribute is for some process in that system or device to track it.)

Tracking an attribute is contrasted with *computing* it. Unlike tracking, computing typically requires that the attribute be represented. (The distinction between tracking and computing is a topic of ??.) 7

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